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Article 6

PROPERTY TAX REASSESSMENT: WHO NEEDS IT?
Stewart E. Sterk* and Mitchell L. Englert
INTRODUCTION

As state and federal politicians compete to take credit for popular
programs while avoiding responsibility for tax increases, local property taxes have assumed renewed importance in financing critical public services. Across the country, property taxes remain an important
revenue source for local governments, providing a primary source of
funding for public schools, for police and fire departments, and for
sanitation services.' With the proliferation of unfunded mandates
from state and federal governments, local governments face increased
2
pressure to boost property tax revenues.
*

Mack Professor of Law, Benjamin Cardozo School of Law.

t
Professor of Law, Benjamin Cardozo School of Law. The authors would like
to thank William Fischel, Clay Gillette, Ed Zelinsky, and Elia Fischer for helpful
comments on earlier drafts, and Michael Giusto and Alex Grishman for valuable
research assistance.
1 See Judy Zelio, The Role of Property Taxes in State and Local Finance, 34 ST. TAX
NoTEs 43 (2004) (discussing the connection between property tax and fire and police
protection, schools, and streets). In 2000, the property tax accounted for 72.1% of
local tax revenue in the United States, with wide variation from state to state. Id. at
44.
2 See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Unsolved Problem of the Unfunded Mandate, 23 OHIO
N.U. L. REx,. 741, 744 (1997) ("When local taxes increase to provide mandated services . . . the average taxpayer (erroneously) places responsibility upon the local officeholders who levy the increased taxes, not upon the state or federal officials who
have mandated local costs without providing full reimbursement."). Although the
burdens unfunded mandates place on local officials are clear, scholars disagree about
the efficiency of these mandates. Julie Roin, for instance, argues that local officials
can protect themselves in the political process, mitigating any inefficiencies resulting
from unfunded mandates. SeeJulie A. Roin, Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and
Other Regulations, 93 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 351, 376 (1999) (arguing that local governments
serve as effective intermediaries in the political process, generating a counterweight
to interest group pressure that would otherwise exist with funded mandates). For a
less sanguine perspective, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46
VAND. L. Riv. 1355, 1386 (1993) (cataloguing disabilities local officials face in conducting trench warfare against unfunded mandates).
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The political problems engendered by the need to increase tax
revenues can be, in many ways, more serious with the local property
tax than with the income and sales taxes more prevalent at the federal
and state level. Any rise in the general level of wages and prices generates increased income tax and sales tax revenue, without any need for
politicians to enact a tax increase. 3 By contrast, even in a period of
rising prices, municipal officials can generate additional property tax
revenue only by taking actions for which they can be held politically
accountable: enacting an increase in property tax rates, or reassessing
property to increase the tax base.
When municipal officials seek more revenue, which of these two
actions should they take? So long as the value of all property within
the taxing entity changes in lockstep, taxpayers will face the same economic effect whether the municipality enacts a rate increase or, by
reassessing property, enacts a commensurate increase in the tax base.
Property values, however, do not change in lockstep. 4 As a result, reassessment of property has the potential to change significantly the
distribution of the municipality's tax burden. It is that fact that makes
reassessment a political hot potato.
Advocates of reassessment typically emphasize a fairness concern
based on horizontal equity: properties of equal value should bear
equal tax burdens. 5 Opponents of reassessment focus instead on the
dislocations that result from significant and unanticipated changes in
tax burden, and in particular on the liquidity difficulties that reassessment generates for long-term residents of the community, who might
have purchased their homes when values, and hence taxes, were far
lower. 6
3 At the same time, property taxes are less subject to fluctuation in times of significant economic downturn, such as the one that occurred at the beginning of the
twenty-first century. See Zelio, supra note 1, at 44.
4 See Robert Jerome Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 261, 299 (1990) (noting the potential impact of neighborhood change on relative property values).

5 See, e.g.,
John A. Miller, RationalizingInjustice: The Supreme Court and the Property
Tax, 22 HoFsTRA L. REv. 79, 130-34 (1993).
6 The California Supreme Court summarized this position in sustaining Proposition 13 against constitutional attack, indicating that a property tax based on acquisition price "may be said reasonably to reflect the price [a landowner] was originally
willing and able to pay for his property, rather than an inflated value fixed, after
acquisition, in part on the basis of sales to third parties over which sales he can exercise no control." Amador ValleyJoint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1293 (Cal. 1978); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, The Once and Future
Property Tax: A Dialogue with My Younger Self, 23 CARnozo L. REv. 2199, 2202 (2002)
(stating that rising property values can absorb large percentages of retirees' incomes).
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The debate over reassessment has generated no consensus. Many
states have enacted statutes requiring periodic reassessment of real
property, although practices in those states do not always conform to
the statutory requirements. Other states, by contrast, have moved in
the opposite direction, prohibiting reassessment for as long as a particular owner owns his or her home.
To date, however, the reassessment debate has largely ignored
three critical issues. First, the debate has assumed that property taxes
are ultimately borne by the person with the legal obligation to pay the
tax. 7 Economic theory, however, rejects this conclusion, suggesting
instead that the economic incidence of taxes often differs substantially
from legal incidence. 8 With respect to property taxes in particular,
economic theory predicts that at least some portion of tax differentials
will be capitalized into home price, reducing any unfairness associated
with assessments that depart from market value.
Second, proponents of periodic reassessment implicitly assume
that property value is an objective fact, readily discernible by experts
who observe the subject property. 9 In fact, however, expert appraisals
are costly and unreliable proxies for the value assessment seeks to capture: the price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller. Because reassessments will not accurately and cheaply capture market value, the
fairness case for periodic reassessments is significantly overstated.
The debate has also ignored a third critical issue: the connection
between local tax burdens and local service benefits. When that link
becomes too attenuated, voter-taxpayers become more likely to vote
for inefficient packages of municipal services.' 0 That is, a taxpayer
7

See, e.g., Carin Rubenstein, An Especially Taxing Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,

2003, § 14WC, at I (quoting experts arguing that reassessments are needed "so that
owners of similar houses get similar tax bills, meaning that recipients of services share
the burden equally").
8 SeeJames Heilbrun, Who Bears the Burden of the Property Tax?, in THE PROPERTY
TAX AND LoCAL FINANCE 57, 57-58 (C. Lowell Harriss ed., 1983) (distinguishing between legal and economic incidence of taxes).
9 Indeed, some go further and suggest that inspection may be unnecessary to
determine value. See David M. Herszenhorn, A Path to FairerProperty Taxes, Where PoliticiansFear To Tread, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2000, at BI (contending that "computers and

mass appraising techniques now make it possible to conduct fairly accurate revaluations without the cost of hiring inspectors," but noting also the view of critics who
caution that statistical estimates are no substitute for physical inspections).
10 See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 622-23 (2002)
(reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION,

SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE

POLICIES

(2001)) (discussing (although not ultimately endorsing) the view that in the local
government market, separating tax burdens from tax benefits would generate "the
same disastrous results we might expect to find in a private setting").
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whose tax assessment is low compared to the benefits she receives
from additional municipal services will tend to support additional services even when the costs of those services greatly exceed their benefit;
taxpayers burdened by high assessments will tend to oppose additional services even when those services generate more benefit than
cost. One would expect, then, that municipal decisions will become
more efficient as each taxpayer's share of the tax burden approaches
her proportionate share of municipal benefits.11 To the extent that
municipal benefits are related to property value, efficiency concerns
also support an alignment' between property taxes and property
value.12
How, then, can property tax law encourage efficient decisionmaking and improve tax fairness while avoiding the costs, inaccuracy, and
liquidity difficulties associated with frequent reassessment? We propose that property be reassessed only upon sale, subject to a retrospective tax adjustment, payable by the seller, to compensate for the
seller's low purchase price assessment during the seller's period of
ownership. In its simplest form, taxes for each ownership year would
be recalculated at sale by averaging the homeowner's purchase and
sales prices. This provides a middle ground between a pure acquisition cost system, like California's Proposition 13,13 and a regime of
periodic and costly reassessments. Part I surveys current law's diverse
approaches to property reassessment. Part II develops and evaluates
the horizontal equity case for frequent reassessment, demonstrating
that the equity arguments are generally overstated, but that moral hazard problems arise when assessments deviate significantly from tax
benefits. Part III establishes that the practical problems associated
with any reassessment scheme undermine many of the purported ad11 Another approach to potential inefficiencies in the voting process would connect voting rights to tax burdens. Thus, some states have authorized special purpose
districts that permit only property owners to vote, and in some cases, that allocate
voting rights in proportion to assessed valuation. See generally Richard Briffault, Who
Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 339,
365-66 (1993) (discussing the historical developments of the proprietary model of
local governance). The United States Supreme Court, however, has foreclosed this
option for most local governments, and for local school districts. Kramer v. Union
Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (applying one-person/one-vote requirements to
school districts); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (applying one-person/one-vote requirements to local governments). See generally Briffault, supra, at
345-59 (discussing the Supreme Court's extension of the one-person/one-vote structure to local governance and school districts).
12 When property taxes correlate poorly with property value, inefficient decisions
to sell (or to hold) property may result. See infra Part IV.B.I.c.
13

CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
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vantages of frequent reassessment. Part IV develops our reform proposal, demonstrating its significant advantages over all current

approaches.
I.

THE STATUS Quo: EXISTING PROPERTY TAX REGIMES

Although local governments typically collect and expend most
property taxes, state constitutions and statutes provide the regulatory
framework under which municipalities operate. 14 In particular, many
state constitutions provide that property shall be taxed in proportion
to its value.15 In other states, legislation requires assessment at full
value or a uniform percentage of value.1 6 Many states qualify the proportionality requirement by permitting municipalities to tax different
classes of property at different rates; residential property, for instance,
might be taxed at a different percentage of value than commercial
property. 17 And, of course, most states authorize a variety of exemptions from property taxation.
Value serves as the foundation for the property tax in virtually
every jurisdiction, but states differ radically in how, and how often,
they determine the value of real property. Some states do not impose
any requirement on municipalities to conduct wholesale revaluations
of property within municipal borders. In these states, many municipalities retain historic assessments for decades; an individual property
is reassessed only if the property owner mounts a successful challenge
to her own assessment.
14 Indeed, one commentator has noted that "state governments and voters have
imposed so many restrictions on local access to the [property] tax that it has become
crippled beyond recognition." Therese J. McGuire, Alternatives to Property Taxationfor
Local Government, in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 300, 308
(Wallace E. Oates ed., 2001).
15 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this Section, taxes upon real property shall be levied uniformly by valuation . . . ."); N.J.

CONST. art. VIII, § I ("All real property assessed and taxed locally or by the State ...
shall be assessed according to the same standard of value, except as otherwise permitted herein . .. ."); TEX. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1 (b) ("All real property... shall be taxed in
proportion to its value .... ").
16 See, e.g., N.Y. RsAL PROP. TAX LAW § 305(2) (McKinney 2000) ("All real property in each assessing unit shall be assessed at a uniform percentage of value .... ");
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3201 (2004) ("All general reassessments or 'annual' assessments
in those localities which have annual assessments of real estate.., shall be made at
100 percent fair market value .... ).
17

See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(b) (permitting counties with a population of

more than two hundred thousand to classify real property for tax purposes); N.Y.
REAL PROP. TAX LAW §.305(2) (permitting cities with a population greater than one
million to adopt "classified assessment standard[s]").
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New York provides an example. State legislation provides municipalities with some incentives to reassess property, but imposes no duty
to do so. An individual landowner may challenge an assessment either on the ground that the assessment exceeds market value,1 8 or
that the assessment is at a higher proportion of market value than
other parcels on the assessment roll. 19 These standards erect significant barriers for an ordinary homeowner; so long as the assessments
are based on values set in the distant past, few valuations are likely to
exceed market value. Because homeowners have limited ability to
evaluate relative values of other homes in the area, proving that their
assessments are disproportionate becomes difficult. As a result, a municipality that chooses not to update old assessments is likely to face
challenges largely from commercial owners with the resources to compile the data necessary to mount a successful challenge. 20 And it is the
21
rare assessing unit that chooses to engage in wholesale revaluation.
The result is assessments that often bear little relationship to current
market values.
Other states, of which California is the most notable, require reassessment of real property upon sale, and then essentially preclude re18 N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 524(2) (permitting challenges where assessment is
excessive); id. § 701(4) (defining an excessive assessment as one "which exceeds the
full value of real property").
19 Id. § 524(2) (permitting challenges where the assessment is unequal); id.
§ 701(8) (defining an unequal assessment as one "which is made at a higher proportionate valuation than the assessed valuation of other real property on the same roll").
20 Indeed, it is New York's statutory response to challenges by commercial owners
that provides the impetus for the few wholesale revaluations that do occur. Successful
commercial challenges to existing assessments can require payment of large refunds
by taxing units. For instance, before a 2002 revaluation, New York's Nassau County
faced an annual bill for tax refunds that exceeded one hundred million dollars, most
resulting from challenges by large commercial owners. Vivian S. Toy, Nassau Again
Faces Tax Refund Backlog, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2004, § 14LI, at 2; see also Debra West,
Feud Erupts in Rye, in Print and in Public, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, § 14WC, at 5 (noting that the Town of Rye began a revaluation project in response to payment of eighteen million dollars in tax reimbursements over a ten-year period).
21 Consider the following description of the assessment situation in suburban
Westchester County:
The only Westchester town to have updated its tax assessment system is Pelham, which now has annual revaluations; in addition, the Town of Rye is in
the process of conducting a town-wide reassessment. Every other Westchester municipality, however, is taxing homeowners based on assessments that
are, on average, 38 years old, and thus reflect and preserve quirky and even
inequitable judgments. That excludes Mount Vernon, with an assessment
roll that is literally an antique, dating all the way back to 1853, according to
Anthony DeBellis, the commissioner of assessment.
Rubenstein, supra note 7.
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assessment until resale. 22 The California assessment scheme, enacted
as one component of Proposition 13's move for property tax relief,
permits assessment changes to reflect the consumer price index (but
not to exceed two percent per year);23 more significant changes in
24
assessment are postponed until title is transferred to a new owner.
The California scheme has been heavily criticized for preferring
existing homeowners over new residents, 2 5 but the United States Supreme Court has rejected a constitutional attack on this discrimination, 26 and other states have incorporated versions of the California
statute into their own reassessment schemes. Florida, for instance,
now provides for reassessment upon sale, with a three percent limit on
subsequent reassessments until a later sale. 27 Although California and
Florida both provide for reassessment upon sale, neither relies on the
sale price as conclusive evidence of value; California creates a rebuttable presumption that the sale price equals fair market value, 28 while
Florida anticipates that the property will be evaluated by professional
29
appraisers or assessors.
22 See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(a).
23 Id. § 2(b); CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 51(a)(1) (West Supp. 2005). See generally
Arthur O'Sullivan, Limits on Local Property Taxation: The United States Experience, in
PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE, supra note 14, at 177, 180-81
(tracing the history of Proposition 13 and comparable measures in other states).
24 SeeCAL. CONsT. art. XIIIA, § 2(b); CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 51(a) (1). Seegener-

ally O'Sullivan, supra note 23, at 197 (discussing California, Florida, and Michigan
schemes assessing property based on acquisition value).

25 See Mary LaFrance, ConstitutionalImplications of Acquisition-Value Real Property
Taxation: Assessing the Burdens on Travel and Commerce, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1027; Miller,
supranote 5; Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and Local
FiscalPolicy at the Intersection of Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The Property Tax as a
Case in Point, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 511, 529-33 (2002); Terri A. Sexton et al.,
Proposition 13: Unintended Effects and Feasible Reforms, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 99 (1999).
26 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10-18 (1992).
27 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.155(3) (West Supp. 2005). The Florida statute is limited
to homestead property. Id. The Michigan Constitution includes a similar limitation
on increased assessments during the tenure of any particular owner. MICH. CONST.
art. IX, § 3; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.27a (West Supp. 2005) (limiting
increases in assessment value to the inflationary rate unless ownership is transferred).
28 CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 110(b).
29 The Florida statute formally requires reassessment each year, and physical inspection of the property every three years. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.023 (West 1999).
Once the appraiser reassesses the property, the homeowner's taxes are based on the
lesser of the reassessment and the homeowner's original assessment augmented by
the increase in the consumer price index, not to exceed three percent per year. Id.
§ 193.155(1) (West Supp. 2005).
Michigan does not even indulge in the presumption that the sale price reflects
fair market value. MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 211.27(5) ("Beginning December 31,
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A third group of states takes a completely different approach, requiring periodic and frequent reassessments in an effort to ensure a
30
close connection between assessed value and current market value.
Recognizing the heavy burden associated with frequent physical inspections for the purposes of appraising value and the allure of new
technology, these states do not always require physical inspection each
time reassessment is required. In Connecticut, for instance, the statute requires physical inspection every ten years, although revaluation
31
of some sort is required every five years.
In some states, the push for frequent reassessment has been fueled in part by the notion that computerization can facilitate accurate
assessments at far less cost and with far greater accuracy than traditional assessment methods. 32 That notion, however, ignores the fact
that no computer model can be any better than the data and assumptions used in developing the model. 33 And accumulating the data requires the same fieldwork and judgment that has always accompanied
the assessment process.
Statutory schemes that require frequent reassessment have generated yet another problem: long-term homeowners, especially retirees
and others on fixed incomes, often face liquidity problems when tax
assessments, and consequently tax bills, increase significantly to reflect
changes in market value. In response, states often enact statutory provisions-generally known as circuit breakers-to protect certain classes of homeowners from the full impact of reassessments. 3 4 The scope
of these circuit-breaker provisions varies significantly from state to
1994, the purchase price paid in a transfer of property is not the presumptive true
cash value of the property transferred.").
30 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-62(b) (West Supp. 2005) (requiring reassessment every fifth year); TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.18(b) (Vernon 2001) (requiring
appraisal offices to provide for reappraisal of all property at least once every three
years); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3250 to -3261 (2004) (specifying reassessment cycles for
various types of municipalities).
31 Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-62(a) (3) (requiring physical inspection
every ten years), with id. § 12-62(b) (requiring revaluation every five years).
32 For an early endorsement of increased computer use, see Charles C. Cook,
Computers in Local Property-Tax Administration, in THE PROPERTY TAX AND LOCAL FiNANCE, supra note 8, at 95, 105-06.
33 Cf Edward A. Zelinsky, ForRealization:Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and
the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDozo L. REV. 861, 881-82 (1997) (arguing that
adjudications of real property values are unreliable because property owners have no
incentive to reveal what they believe their property is worth).
34 See generally Steven D. Gold, Circuit-Breakers and Other Relief Measures, in THE
PROPERTY TAX AND LOCAL FINANCE, supra note 8, at 148 (discussing proliferation of
state property tax relief programs for homeowners in the latter half of the twentieth
century).
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state. 35 Alternatively, states may offer deferral programs that permit
homeowners to postpone payment of tax until death or transfer of the
property. 3 6 These programs-rarely used by homeowners 37-permit
some homeowners with liquidity difficulties to retain their homes
even when they cannot pay current taxes.
To summarize, then, state law reflects at least three different patterns with respect to property tax assessment. The first two-no reassessment and cost reassessment at sale-have been heavily criticized
for unfairness because of their significant reliance on outdated market values. In contrast, the third-frequent reassessment even absent
sales-involves significant municipal costs, and requires some mechanism for dealing with long-term homeowners who are unable, or feel
unable, to afford significant tax increases attributable to new assessments. In the next Part, we confront the equity case for frequent
reassessments.
II.

THE CASE FOR FREQUENT REASSESSMENTS:

HoRIzoNTAL

EQUITY,

PERCEPTION, AND ALLOCATIONAL EFFICIENCY

The basic argument for frequent reassessment of property is
rooted in horizontal equity concerns: like taxpayers should be treated
alike. 38 Because the property tax is a tax on property value, properties
of equal value should bear equal tax burden. The obvious analogy is
35

Examples of circuit-breaker programs include those codified in CONN. GEN.
§ 12-170aa; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-5-47.1 (1999); and MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 211.7u (West 2003).
36 These deferral programs are not necessarily tied to reassessment, but they nevertheless ease liquidity problems senior citizens would face upon reassessment. Sometimes the programs permit deferral even when taxes have not increased. See, e.g., 320
STAT. ANN.

ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.

30/3 (West 2001). In other states, deferral is available only for

increased taxes. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-64-201 (a) (1998); see also Adrienne
Blum, You Could Get a Break on Property Taxes, KiPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG., Aug. 1992,
at 83, 83 (listing states which provide deferral option along with qualifications).
37 One survey concludes that one out of seventy-two eligible households makes
use of deferral options. David Baer, Awareness and Popularityof Property Tax Relief Programs, 5 ASSESSMENT J. 47, 53 (1998). For possible reasons explaining such limited
use, see Joan Youngman, The Hardest Challengefor Value-Based Property Taxes: Part , 16
ST. TAx NOTES 745, 747 (1999) (asserting that deferral programs are "notoriously
underutilized" due to high state charges for deferral, lack of awareness of the programs, and reluctance to have liens placed on the property).
38 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 25, at 528 (arguing that the use of acquisition
value rather than fair market value makes it impossible for "the taxing authority to
deliberately treat similarly situated taxpayers in the same manner"); Carl Shoup, The
Property Tax Versus Sales and Income Taxes, in THE PROPERTY TAX AND LOCAL FINANCE,
supra note 8, at 31, 32 ("Equal treatment of equals under a tax law is universally
accepted as desirable.").
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to the income tax, where the premise that equal income should gener39
ate equal tax enjoys widespread support.
Property values, like other market values, change over time.
Sometimes the changes are due simply to inflation. At other times,
the changes are due to changes in interest rates, or in the relative
desirability of alternative investments. And at still other times, the
changes are due to factors peculiar to a particular neighborhood or to
improvements of the particular property. The standard horizontal equity argument posits that property assessments should change to reflect these changes in value; if assessments remain the same while
40
values change, like taxpayers receive disparate treatment.
Perception alone provides a reason for taking steps to ensure that
property tax assessments track fair market value. No one likes taxes,
but taxpayers generally feel more aggrieved by a tax with an apparent
inequitable distribution of the burden. 4 1 Equal value generates equal
tax is, for many, an appealing equitable principle. Absent countervailing considerations, reassessment to assure that property taxes remain proportional to fair market value appears to be a sensible
starting point.
The horizontal equity argument for frequent reassessments, however, rests not simply on perception, but also on at least two unexplored premises. First, the horizontal equity argument assumes that
current market value should be the appropriate basis for the property
39

See, e.g., Richard D. Hobbet, TransitionalMechanisms To FacilitateTax Reform, 34
CONTEMP. PROBS. 818, 821-22 (1969) (noting that while disagreements arise
over the reach of income, "[i]t is relatively easy to find agreement for the statement
that taxpayers having equal amounts of income should pay equal amounts of tax"); see
also Michael Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 79 (1977) ("Perhaps the most widely accepted notion of fairness
in taxation is the concept of horizontal equity ....
[While determination of similarlysituated taxpayers is] fraught with ethical and theoretical difficulties . . . the basic
notion of horizontal equity-equal treatment of equals-is widely shared and easily
understood."). Some scholars question the significance of horizontal equity as an
independent norm. See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and
Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993).
40 The argument is often advanced by appraisers, whose professional livelihood
depends in some measure on frequent updating of market value. See, e.g., Irr'LAsS'N
LAW &

OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, PROPERTY APPRAISAL AND ASSESSMENT ADMINISTRATION

3 (Jo-

seph K. Eckert et al. eds., 1990) ("Appraised values used for tax purposes must be
accurate so that the tax burden will be distributed fairly.").
41 HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 529 (7th ed. 2005) ("To the extent that [the
property tax] valuation is done incompetently (or corruptly), the tax is perceived as
unfair."); see also id. at 309 (noting that the perceived unfairness of a new tax based on
where an individual lived was one factor that led to Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher's downfall in 1990).
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tax. That assumption, however, raises questions about the underlying
justifications for a property tax. Second, the horizontal equity argument assumes that the property tax burden shouldered by each individual property owner can be measured by, or is at least proportional
to, the property tax formally assessed on the subject parcel. If the
correlation is weaker, then the horizontal equity case for frequent reassessments is correspondingly weaker. This Part starts by examining
these two questions: why a property tax, and who bears its burden?
After concluding that capitalization of differential tax assessments
weakens the horizontal equity argument for frequent reassessments,
this Part moves on to consider the moral hazard problem generated
by tax assessments unrelated to market value, and concludes that arbitrary assessments are likely to generate inefficient taxing and spending decisions.
A.

Justificationsfor a Property Tax

As with most taxes, the principal objective of the property tax is to
raise revenue in an efficient and equitable manner. 42 Why do municipalities use the property tax to raise revenue rather than the income
and sales taxes more prevalent at the state and federal levels? 4 3 In

part, history provides an answer: the antecedents of the modem property tax long predate the sales and income taxes. 44 Good reasons supported that historical preference. First, in an era before formalized,
long-term employment relationships, tax withholding was impractical,
making an income tax more complicated to administer than a prop42 See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Frictionsas a Constraint on Tax Planning,101 COLUM.
L. REV. 1312, 1360 (2001) (noting that the tax system's underlying goal "is to raise
revenue equitably and efficiently"). Some taxes might have a regulatory principal
objective, such as excise taxes on disfavored activities. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman,
ConstitutionalDecision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 67, 68-69 (2004) (discussing "Congress's
Tax Power and the Regulatory Effects Problem").
43 Federal census data reveals that, in 1995, local governments collected two hundred billion dollars in property taxes, forty-three billion dollars in general sales taxes,
and thirteen billion dollars in income taxes. KirkJ. Stark, The Right To Vote on Taxes,
96 Nw. U. L. REV. 191, 225 (2001) (citing U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES STATE & LocAl- FINANCES BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT: 1995-96,
available at http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/9600us.html); see also McGuire,
supra note 14, at 302-06 (demonstrating that property tax revenue was significantly
higher than revenue from any other local tax source for local governments during
both 1977 and 1992).
44 See generallyJohnJoseph Wallis, A History of the Property Tax in America, in PROPERTfY TAXATION AND LocAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE, supra note 14, at 123 (discussing

the historical development of the property tax in the United States).
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erty tax.45 Second, until the twentieth century, land was a particularly
good surrogate for wealth, and hence ability to pay. 4 6 Third, enforce-

ment of property tax obligations was particularly easy: foreclosure on
47
the delinquent property.
Some of these reasons have become less persuasive in the modern era, but the property tax has endured, in part because states have
not generally authorized municipalities to collect sales or income
taxes. 48 Moreover, it would not, in any event, be administratively feasible for most local governments to administer their own income or
sales taxes; to reduce administrative costs, those taxes would have to
"piggyback" on state collections. 49 And state officials might prefer to
divorce themselves from any association with local taxes. From their
See Robert Inman, Commentary, in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LocAL GOVERNMENT
supra note 14, at 148, 150 (noting that before 1900, informal economy was
large and "record-keeping for most small businesses was idiosyncratic to nonexistent,"
making the property tax, administratively, a lower-cost tax than the sales tax or the
income tax).
46 No less an economist than Adam Smith recognized that house rents repre45

FINANCE,

sented a good proxy for wealth. 2

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND

369 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1976)
(1776). House rents, however, were not publicly reported, raising evasion opportunities. Smith recounted the various English attempts to tax indicia of house rents-first
hearths and then windows-that made evasion more difficult. Id. at 369-73. For
further discussion, see Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151, 165-66 (1997).
47 Tax foreclosure sales do impose administrative burdens on municipal officials,
and federal constitutional requirements increase those burdens, at least to some degree. Cf Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798-800 (1983) (holding that due process requires notice by mail or other means certain to ensure actual
notice when the municipal official knows or can obtain knowledge of the address of
the person entitled to notice). In recent years, some municipalities have sold tax liens
to private parties, avoiding many of these burdens. See Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens,
Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 IND. L.J. 747, 760-63 (2000). Indeed, private collection
of taxes can be traced to Roman times. Id. at 758.
48 States might reasonably be concerned that, left unconstrained by state law, municipalities would choose to impose taxes that fall most heavily on outsiders. As one
scholar has put it, "(g]iven a choice of tax instruments, the welfare-maximizing local
decisionmaker should be expected to make maximum use of exportable taxes."
Stark, supranote 43, at 221. From the perspective of state legislators, such taxes may
be unattractive, either because the tax undermines the accountability of government,
id., or because the tax will be politically unpopular with constituents from neighboring municipalities. As Stark points out, however, even if a municipality imposes a tax
that falls initially on outsiders (such as a sales tax on a shopping center near the
municipal border), local residents may nevertheless bear the ultimate burden of the
tax as outsiders relocate their economic activities. Id. at 223.
49 See Richard A. Musgrave, Commentary, in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LoCAL GovERNMENT FINANCE, supra note 14, at 339, 341.
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

2006]

PROPERTY TAX

REASSESSMENT:

WHO NEEDS

IT?

1049

perspective, it is far better for local officials to shoulder responsibility
50
for local taxes.

Although history and politics play a substantial role in explaining
the persistence of the property tax, the tax is not without enduring
justifications. The property tax retains some aspects of a tax on bene51
fits conferred, and also some aspects of a tax based on ability to pay.
1. The Property Tax as a Benefits Tax
In a broad sense, any tax is a benefits tax; any governmental entity
seeks to tax those who benefit from government services, and generally to exclude from benefits those who pay no tax. 52 Local property

taxes certainly fit that pattern. 53 Indeed, with respect to residential
suburbs and small towns and cities, the property tax has been characterized as "the dues one pays voluntarily to gain access to the services
and facilities the club offers." 54 Those who want the benefits conferred by a particular municipality choose to buy homes in that municipality, knowing that the municipality's property taxes are the price
50 See McGuire, supra note 14, at 309 (noting the propensity of state politicians to
place restrictions on local taxes, taking credit for the tax reduction without having to
bear the costs themselves).
51 Including the property tax in a tax system that also relies on sales and income
taxes generates another benefit: diversification, which reduces the impact of defects
in any particular tax. See generally RobertJ. Cline & John Shannon, The Property Tax in
a Model State-Local Revenue System, in THE PROPERTY TAX AND LocAL FiNANCE, supra
note 8, at 42, 46-47 (discussing "several real virtues" of the property tax when used in
moderation by local governments).
52 Wallis, supra note 44, at 125 ("All governments would like to levy benefit
taxes-taxes paid by the people who benefit directly from the government services
the taxes finance-but local governments are consistently able to do so."). There are
limited exceptions, such as the income tax exemption for low-income taxpayers. See
I.R.C. §§ 1, 63(b) (2000).
53 See Wallis, supra note 44, at 141 ("The property tax can operate as a benefit tax
only if the government spends money on services that are geographically specific.");
id. at 145 (concluding that local governments, but not states, can use the benefit
features of the property tax to match taxpayers and beneficiaries).
54 Dick Netzer, Local Property Taxation in Theory and Practice: Some Reflections, in
PROPERTY TAXATION AND

LoCAL GOVERNMENT

FINANCE,

supra note 14, at 321, 328.

The benefits view is less compelling with regard to large cities. See id. at 325-27; see
also George R. Zodrow, Reflections on the New View and the Benefit View of the Property Tax,
in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LocAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE, supra note 14, at 79, 93 &
n.23 (noting that the descriptive force of the benefits theory varies with the context).
The benefits view also loses force regarding property taxes paid by businesses. See,
e.g., Thomas J. Nechyba, The Benefit View and the New View: Where Do We Stand, TwentyFive Years into the Debate?, in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LocAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE,
supra note 14, at 113, 117.
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for those benefits. 55 Indeed, property taxation and the attendant benefits provide the basis for Tiebout-style competition among municipalities that transforms public goods into private goods and leads to
more efficient production and distribution of those goods. 56 By contrast, the base for the income and sales tax may be more mobile than
the property tax base, increasing the opportunity for individuals to
avoid the tax while accepting municipal benefits, thus reducing the
57
likelihood of efficient production of goods and services.
The argument so far has been that the aggregate level of property
taxation imposed by any municipality is closely related to the benefits
its residents, in the aggregate, derive from those taxes. 58 The next
question is whether the property tax reflects the relative benefits derived by individual residents of the municipality. With respect to some
municipal services-fire and police protection, for example-the answer is probably yes. Residents whose homes are more valuable derive
more benefit from municipal services designed to protect persons and
property.5 9 But outside of major cities, the most expensive service financed by the property tax is public education. 60 And the connection

55 Cf Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes
Under the FederalIncome Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 431-33 (1996) (using this premise to
support an argument for nondeductibility of local taxes because local taxes are essentially the price taxpayers pay for local services).
56 See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 418-23 (1956) (discussing the ways in which public expenditures at the
local level, unlike at the federal level, can be made more efficient by resembling an
open market).
57 See McGuire, supra note 14, at 310 ("Individuals can avoid sales and income
taxes by shopping and working.., in neighboring jurisdictions, whereas the property
tax is unavoidable."); see also Steven M. Sheffrin, Commentary, in PROPER-TY TAXATION
AND LocAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE, supra note 14, at 315, 317-18 (noting avoidance
difficulties that would be generated by using sales and income taxes at the local level);
Joel M. Stern, Optimality and Property Taxation: An Alternative Approach, in THE PROPERTY TAx AND LocAL FINANCE, supra note 8, at 204, 204 ("In contrast to income that
can be transferred geographically to other jurisdictions, property can be taxed locally
for local government.").
58 By one estimate, eighty percent of all local property tax revenues might be
conceived as benefit taxes. Netzer, supra note 54, at 333.
59 Cf Kaplow, supra note 55, at 427 (" [T] hose who have more luxurious houses
may benefit more from police protection and road quality.").
60 One estimate, based on data from the 1992 Census of Governments, concludes
that about 52% of local government property tax revenue, nationwide, is devoted to
education financing. Netzer, supra note 54, at 331.
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between property value and benefits derived from public education is
61
somewhat more tenuous.
The benefits derived from a municipality's maintenance of its
school system are twofold. 62 First, the students educated in the system
(and their parents) benefit directly from the public education they
receive. A tax based on property value correlates poorly to this benefit; children of parents who own small houses receive the same education as children of parents with expensive houses. 63 But the right to
use a school system, and especially a high quality school system, increases the value of property within the school district even if the current occupants make no use of that system. 64 This second benefit
correlates quite well with value of property within the municipality.
A well calibrated benefits tax would account for both of these
benefits. A property tax based on current value of property does not.
In at least two ways, a property tax that relies in part on historical
value rather than current value may better capture the benefits generated by public schools. First, on average, the residents who benefit
from public schools will be people who have purchased their homes
more recently. Few homeowners will be deriving direct benefit from
the public schools thirty years after their initial purchase; children are
65
more likely to use schools during the early years of home ownership.
Second, to the extent homeowners derive indirect benefit from
schools through increased home values, that indirect benefit is not
realized until sale; a property tax that deferred some of the tax obligation until sale would generally be more consistent with a benefits justi61 See Kaplow, supra note 55, at 423 ("[A] resident who lives in a mansion pays
much greater property taxes than one who lives in a small house, yet they have access
to the same schools ....

").

62 For present purposes, we will exclude the external benefit conferred on the
public at large when the citizenry is better educated.
63 Conversely, the elderly or others who do not use the public schools receive
none of this benefit but may pay significant property taxes. Cf Fennell, supra note 10,
at 637-38 ("Families with children enrolled in the public school system typically consume far more . . . resources . . . than do families without children.").
64 Much of the local government literature has recognized that the benefits of
municipal services are, to some extent, capitalized into home prices. The debate is
over the degree of capitalization. The premise behind William Fischel's influential
work is that capitalization is pervasive. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE,
AND LAND-USE POLICIES 47-51 (2001). Others, while conceding some capitalization,
are more skeptical about its scope. See, e.g., Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1824, 1830 (2003) (reviewing FISCHEL, supra).
65 SeeJANEJ. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADvERsARY DEMOCRACY 93 (1983) (noting that
in the New England town that served as the subject of study, newcomers had more
school-aged children than long-term residents).
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fication than a tax collected each year based on then-current market
value.
Our objective in this section is not to present a rigorous case for
any particular change in the property tax; we defer that objective until
later in this Article. Instead, this section has been designed to show
that if the property tax is conceived as a benefits tax, a focus on current market value as the tax base is not inevitable. Indeed, too much
focus on current market value weakens the argument that property
taxation constitutes a well tailored form of benefits taxation.
2.

The Property Tax as an Ability-to-Pay Tax

In evaluating other broad-based taxes, particularly taxes on income and consumption, scholars typically focus not on whether the
distribution of tax burdens mirrors the distribution of government
benefits, but rather on whether the tax accurately captures taxpayers'
relative ability to pay. 6 6 This view not only acknowledges, but embraces, a separation between tax payments and benefits as a potential
redistribution vehicle. Local taxes based on ability to pay, however,
face a significant problem: taxpayer mobility.6 7 If a municipality seeks

to impose too large a share of the cost of municipal services on
wealthy taxpayers, those taxpayers will choose to locate in a municipality that more closely aligns taxes with benefits received. 68 Competition among municipalities to attract taxpayers who will pay more in
66 See, e.g., David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX
L. REV. 499, 500 (2000) ("The classic equitable justification for the income tax is that
a tax should be based on ability to pay and income is the best measure of ability to
pay.").
67 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 55, at 472 & n.157 (citing authorities); see also infra
Part II.C (discussing the moral hazard voting concern at the local level which thus
provides a second impediment to local-level redistribution).
68 As Richard Briffault has observed: "Contemporary cities, as a rule, do not engage in innovative redistributive programs ... because they fear that initiating such
programs would cause residential and commercial taxpayers to depart." Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 346, 408
(1990).
Indeed, it is this fact that has led many reformers associated with the political left
to advocate a greater role for state and regional governments in funding public education, reducing the ability of the wealthy to avoid redistribution by moving to municipalities without poor people and consequently without redistribution-based policies.
See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000); Gerald E. Frug,
Beyond Regional Government, 115 I-tARv. L. REV. 1763 (2002); Schragger, supra note 64,
at 1855 ("[O]ur current localism and the fiscal inequities that accompany it can only
be tempered by some form of state- or regionwide input.").
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taxes than they consume in services constrains municipal efforts to
69
implement a tax system that focuses too heavily on ability to pay.
Nevertheless, taxpayer mobility is far from perfect, leaving some
room for municipalities to correlate local taxes with ability to pay. Be70
cause most Americans have no other asset as valuable as their home,
a tax on the value of that home correlates to some degree with personal wealth which is, along with income, a significant component of
ability to pay. 7 1 For a variety of reasons, however, the correlation is
rough at best.
First, the property tax is a tax on the total market value of the
property, not a tax on the owner's equity. As a result, an owner with
the resources to pay cash for a $300,000 home bears the same tax as
72
an owner who has put $30,000 down and bears a $270,000 mortgage.
Second, neither the market value nor the owner's equity in the property correlate particularly well with the liquidity necessary to pay current taxes. 73 An owner who purchased a home for $100,000 fifteen
years ago may-or may not-have resources comparable to a person
who purchased an identical home recently for $300,000. Much depends on the relative rate of increase in personal income and real
estate prices. If real estate has increased more rapidly than personal
income, people who purchased fifteen years ago, on average, would
69 Cf Kaplow, supra note 55, at 444 ("[T]he potential out-migration of the
wealthy and in-migration of the poor may lead the jurisdiction to provide a mix of
public goods and services that is more valuable to the wealthy."); Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
The Economics of the Local Public Sector, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 571,
630-31 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987) ("[L]ocal governments are
likely to be most responsive to the variations in demands for public goods.").
70 Joseph Tracy et al., Are Stocks Overtaking Real Estate in Household Portfolios?, FED.
REs. BANK OF N.Y. CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN., Apr. 1999, at 5, 5.
71 See Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 66, at 500 (noting that while income tax
proponents often justify the income tax as the best measure of ability to pay, "[bloth
greater wealth and greater income clearly are correlated with greater ability to pay");
see also EdwardJ. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX.
L. REv. 1145, 1167-68 (1992) (describing arguments supporting a consumption tax
on ability-to-pay grounds); Robinson, supra note 25, at 521-22 ("[Mlarket value has
been generally viewed as a rough proxy for ability to pay.").
72 See generally Kneave Riggall, Comprehensive Tax Base Theory, Transaction Costs, and
Economic Efficiency: How To Tax Our Way to Efficiency, 17 VA. TAX REv. 295, 312-13
(1997) (noting problems with a property tax that fails to account for mortgages and
other debt secured by taxed properties).
73 This discussion includes liquidity concerns under the ability-to-pay rubric. Alternatively, liquidity could be treated as a concern distinct from ability to pay. Com-

pare WILLIAM A.

KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

6 (13th ed. 2003) (stating

that while a "narrow view" of ability to pay would consider liquidity, a "broader
view... would look at people's material well-being without regard to liquidity"), with
id. at 202 (recognizing liquidity as a valid concern for certain taxpayers).
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not be able to purchase the same house today; if personal income has
increased more rapidly than real estate prices, people who bought fifteen years ago, on average, have more available resources than more
recent purchasers of comparable homes.
The point is that a property tax levied on current market value is
one of several property taxes that would correlate positively with ability to pay. A tax on homeowner equity would have a positive correlation, as would a tax based on the homeowner's initial purchase price.
The correlation between current market value and ability to pay might
generally be closer than the correlation generated by the alternative
tax bases, but no a priori principle dictates that result. And we know
of no empirical studies that measure the relative correlation of these
alternative tax bases with ability to pay.
B.

Who Bears the Property Tax Burden: Capitalizationof
Tax Differentials

This Part started with a recitation of the basic argument for continuous reassessment of property to current market value: like cases
should be treated alike; properties of equal value should bear equal
tax burdens. Part II.A demonstrated, however, that what constitutes a
like case is a question fraught with some difficulty. This subpart turns
to a related question: who bears the property tax. In one sense, the
answer is obvious: the owner of the subject property bears the legal
obligation to pay the tax on that property. But the legal obligation to
74
pay the tax is not the same as the economic incidence of the tax.

Indeed, the economics literature has generated considerable debate over the ultimate incidence of the property tax. 75 The "benefit
view" holds that property taxes are fully capitalized into home values,
so that property owners as a group bear the full brunt of the property
tax. 7 6 The "new view" (which appears to be nearly as old as the benefit view) argues instead that the property tax is ultimately a tax on
74 See generally Heilbrun, supra note 8 (distinguishing between legal and economic incidence and noting that evaluating economic incidence entails examining
whether the person with the legal obligation can shift the burden of the tax to other

persons).
See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL
365, 392 (2004) (noting that the literature on the scope of capitalization of
taxes is mixed but concluding that it is clear that "some level of capitalization
occurs").
76 Expositions of this view include: William A. Fischel, Municipal Corporations,
Homeowners and the Benefit View of the Property Tax, in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LoCAL
75

ISSUES

GOVERNMENT FINANCE,

supra note 14, at 33, 58-60; Bruce W. Hamilton, Capitalization

of IntrajurisdictionalDifferences in Local Tax Prices, 66 Am. ECON. REV. 743 (1976).
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capital owners generally. 77 But proponents of the new view argue only
that the average or aggregate burden of the property tax falls on capital generally; they concede that local residents will bear the full burden of an increase in the property tax. 78 Neither theory, however,
focuses on the distribution of property tax burdens within a given
municipality.
This subpart demonstrates first that within any municipality, even
if tax assessments are entirely arbitrary but permanently fixed in
amount, the differentials among comparable homes will largely be
capitalized into house price, so that the overall housing costs of owners with low tax assessments will equal the overall costs of owners with
high assessments. This subpart then considers the impact of assessments that are subject to change-either at periodic intervals or upon
sale of the property.
1. Arbitrary but Fixed Assessments
Consider a municipality with a tax rate of one percent on the
assessed value of all real property within its borders. Suppose that two
comparable homes are assessed at grossly different values: one at
$500,000 and the other at $300,000. Prospective purchasers understand that the tax on one home will be $5000, but the tax on the other
home will be only $3000. Because the two homes are located in the
same municipality, a prospective purchaser will receive the same benefits regardless of the home she purchases. That is, if she has three
school-age children, she will receive the same schooling regardless of
house. How would a prospective purchaser respond to the differential assessment? Economic theory (and common sense) predicts that
she would pay significantly more for the home assessed at $300,000
than for the home assessed at $500,000. In rough, commonsense
terms, even if the purchaser had to borrow more to purchase the lowassessment house, the borrowing would be worthwhile whenever the

77 The new view starts with the assumption that the overall national supply of
capital is perfectly inelastic, and argues that any increase in the level of property taxation reduces the return to that capital, functioning in effect as a profits tax. See Peter
Mieszkowski, The Property Tax: An Excise Tax or a Profits Tax ?, I J. PUB. ECON. 73 (1972);
Zodrow, supra note 54, at 81.
78 See Zodrow, supra note 54, at 105; see also Wallace E. Oates, Property Taxation
and Local Government Finance: An Overview and Some Reflections, in PROPERTY TAXATION
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE, supra note 14, at 21, 22 ("[B] oth theories imply that
the benefits and costs of local programs are borne locally ....
).

1056

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 81:3

additional money borrowed is more than offset by the tax savings gen79
erated by the low assessment.
The implications of this analysis are important. If 100% of the
difference in tax burden is capitalized into the market price for the
home, the purchaser of a low-assessment home pays precisely the
same amount (in purchase price and taxes) for the combination of
public and private benefits as does the purchaser of a high-assessment
home. The market ultimately shifts some of the tax burden from the
high-assessment owner to the low-assessment owner by increasing the
purchase price the low-assessment owner must pay for her home.
Consider the implication of this insight on the "benefits tax" justification for the property tax. Because property taxes are capitalized
into the property's market value, the property tax functions as an effective benefits tax to the extent that municipal benefits are capitalized into property value. And, as we have seen, those benefits are
partially, but not completely, capitalized.
Next, consider the implication of 100% capitalization of property
taxes on an ability-to-pay justification for the tax. Because complete
capitalization links the impact of the tax to the value of the property,
the property tax becomes an ability-to-pay tax to the extent property
value reflects ability to pay. That linkage between tax burden and ability to pay remains constant even as the formal tax base departs from
actual market value. The basic point, then, is that so long as tax burdens are capitalized into market value, arbitrary tax assessments generate the same post-tax consequences to the homeowner-both from
a benefits perspective and from an ability-to-pay perspective-as assessments that perfectly reflect market value.
2.

Assessments Subject to Revision

The preceding section demonstrates that if prospective purchasers could be assured that their tax assessments would not change, one
would expect close to 100% capitalization. That, in turn, would significantly undermine the horizontal equity case for frequent reassess79 In theory, the purchaser should be willing to pay an additional increment for
the house with the low assessment that reflects the capitalized value of the prospective
tax savings. Professor William Fischel has offered a concrete example in practice. He
studied two adjacent municipalities in New Hampshire in which a single developer
had constructed nearly identical homes across municipal boundaries. The two municipalities shared a high school. His study concluded that, even though the tax rate
in one municipality was far higher than in the other, home prices in the low-tax municipality were sufficiently higher that home purchasers would face precisely the same
monthly mortgage and tax payment whether they purchased in the low-tax or hightax municipality total property. FISCHEL, supra note 64, at 40-42.
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ments. 80 How does the analysis change if the municipality sometimes
alters tax assessments?
First, suppose the municipality reassesses all property at periodic
intervals. If the periodic intervals are fixed in advance (e.g., reassessment every ten years), and if the reassessment generates a close approximation to market value, one would still expect close to 100%
capitalization of tax costs. If a particular landowner's parcel is significandy underassessed or overassessed at some point during the periodic interval, the landowner knows that she will enjoy the benefit (or
suffer the detriment) of the assessment until the property is reassessed
at the close of the interval. Hence, the price a purchaser would pay
should reflect, in large measure, the disparity between current assess81
ment and market value.
If the periodic intervals are not fixed in advance, uncertainty
about the duration of the disparity will prevent complete capitalization. Prospective purchasers will make purchasing decisions based on
"guesstimates" about the duration of any tax benefit or detriment, but
there is no assurance that those guesstimates will ultimately prove accurate. As a result, some purchasers will pay more, and others will pay
less, than they would if assessments were all maintained precisely at
fair market value.8 2 From a benefits perspective, this creates an imbal80 Even with capitalization, though, uneven assessments might raise vertical equity concerns due to the federal tax deduction of state property taxes. High-assessment homes therefore generally should gravitate towards high-bracket taxpayers.
Uneven assessments therefore could alter federal tax liabilities relative to a system
with even assessments. The analysis is complicated by the federal alternative minimum tax (AMT), which disallows the property tax deduction in certain cases. While
this somewhat counteracts the vertical equity concern, it also complicates the decision
whether to buy a high-tax or low-tax home. For a discussion of the AMT, see infra
note 160.
81 Capitalization will not be complete unless the purchaser can anticipate prospective changes in the tax rate, changes which would have an obvious impact on the
purchaser's tax burden. Of course, even if the purchaser cannot precisely anticipate
changes in the tax rate, capitalization should be close to complete if the taxpayer were
assured that unanticipated rate changes would generate commensurate changes in
the benefits derived from municipal services. But as we demonstrate below, that assumption is heroic, especially as the connection between taxes and benefits diverges.
See infra Part II.C.

82 Two competing factors will also operate to skew tax burdens away from the
current market value norm. First, assuming prospective purchasers make a range of
guesstimates about the duration of any tax benefit or detriment, the prospective purchasers who are most optimistic in their assessments-those who believe benefits will
endure longest and detriments will end fastest-are most likely to become actual
(rather than prospective) purchasers. Because of their optimistic guesstimates, they
will pay more for the property than their pessimistic competitors. But because there
is no a priori reason to believe that their estimates are more accurate than those of
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ance if we assume that current market value generally reflects benefits
received. From an ability-to-pay perspective, inaccurate guesstimates
will also skew the total tax burden away from ability to pay, as measured by current market value of the property.
Next, suppose the municipality reassesses property upon sale, but
not otherwise. Assuming a general increase in the market value of
homes, a purchaser's assessment will be higher than the assessment of
a neighbor who has owned an equivalent home for a number of years.
This excess tax burden should be reflected in the price the purchaser
pays for the home. At the same time, however, if the purchaser assumes future increases in property value, and assumes future sales of
other homes within the municipality, the purchaser will recognize
that her share of the tax burden will diminish over time. That realization, in turn, will increase the price the purchaser is willing to pay for
the home as the purchaser capitalizes those future benefits. Nevertheless, various forms of uncertainty will prevent complete capitalization
of the tax burden. First, there is little reason to believe that purchasers will guess accurately about the rate of future growth in purchase
prices. Second, purchasers cannot know with precision the future
rate of home sales within the municipality-data essential for estimating future tax burdens in a system that reassesses upon sale. Third,
most purchasers do not know with certainty how long they will remain
in the houses they purchase; because the houses will be reassessed
upon subsequent sales, the purchasers cannot transfer the tax benefits
associated with low assessments.
The basic insight is a simple one: uncertainty inhibits complete
capitalization of tax burdens. The preceding section demonstrated
that arbitrary but fixed tax assessments will be capitalized into home
price. This section predicts that capitalization will remain close to
complete if purchasers know precisely when reassessment will occur.
But when the date of the next reassessment is uncertain, or when the
homeowner's tax burden depends on the duration of her ownership
and the duration of her neighbor's ownership, capitalization will be
less than complete, and the distribution of tax burdens will deviate
from the current market value benchmark.
their competitors, the likelihood is great that prospective purchasers of overvalued
and undervalued properties will, over time, pay more in purchase price and taxes
than purchasers of property valued at current market value.
Competing with this bias in favor of optimistic prospective purchasers, however,
will be a tendency of homeowners generally to be risk-averse. This tendency will generally lead prospective purchasers to undervalue tax benefits and overvalue tax detriments resulting from unequal valuation. How these two factors will interact in
practice is impossible to determine on any a priori basis.
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Empirical work supports this conclusion. The principal studyconducted in the Boston area-proceeded against background legal
principles that required assessment at 100% of fair market value.
Against that background, it would be irrational for purchasers to capitalize 100% of the tax differential, because they faced a significant risk
that reassessment would reduce that differential yet did not know
when that risk would mature into an actual reassessment. The study,
in fact, demonstrated only about 20% capitalization of the tax differ83
ences between comparable homes.

When capitalization is incomplete, the economic incidence of the
tax will, to some extent, track the formal legal burden of the tax. Two
people owning comparable homes with differential assessments might
bear different tax burdens.
What impact does incomplete capitalization of differential tax
burdens have on the "benefits tax" justification for the property tax?
If benefits derived from municipal services were completely capitalized into home price, then tax assessments that deviate from current
market value would weaken the link between taxes and benefits. But,
as we have seen, tax benefits are not completely capitalized into market value, so the ultimate impact on the benefits justification remains
uncertain. If the disparities in tax assessments mirror the uncapitalized benefits of municipal services-as they might in a system where
long-term residents enjoy lower assessments-incomplete capitalization might even bring tax burdens into greater congruence with municipal benefits. If, however, there is no connection between
assessment disparities and uncapitalized benefits, assessments based
on current market value would generally be more consistent with the
benefits tax justification.
It is similarly difficult to assess the impact of incomplete capitalization of differential burdens on the ability-to-pay justification for the
property tax. If market value of the property is a good surrogate for
ability to pay, then in a world of incomplete capitalization, differential
tax assessments for comparable properties will lead to tax results that
deviate from ability to pay. If, however, historic value also captures
some elements of ability to pay, incompletely capitalized tax differentials might be consistent with the ability-to-pay justification-so long
as the tax disparities were related to historic value.

83

JOHN YINGER ET AL., PROPERTY TAXES AND HOUSE VALUES

123-27 (1988).
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Arbitrary Assessments and the Moral Hazard Problem

The preceding subpart demonstrates that the horizontal equity
case for assessments based on current market value is an equivocal
one. Public perception aside, even assessments that bear little relation
to current market value generate no horizontal inequities so long as
those assessments, and the taxes based on the assessments, are fixed.
When assessments (and the resulting taxes) are subject to change, uncertainty about the timing of the change increases the likelihood that
the ultimate tax burden will not be proportional to the current market value of the property. How much horizontal inequity this disproportion generates depends on how good a proxy current market value
is for benefit on the one hand, or ability to pay on the other.
The discussion so far has ignored tax rates. The assumption has
been that tax rates are fixed. Tax rates, however, are not constant.
Rates (and overall tax collections) are set by political processes. Typically, voters or their representatives approve local tax rates. 8 4 This political involvement in the rate-setting process introduces moral hazard
problems that are exacerbated when the tax base is arbitrary.
Modeling political behavior is fraught with peril. Two difficulties
predominate. First, what motivates voters? Do they vote out of selfinterest, as the public choice literature typically assumes,8 5 or are they
motivated more broadly based on ideology, altruism, or other concerns not directly related to self-interest?8 6 Second, do elected officials act as faithful agents, effectively representing the preferences of
84 Cf Stark, supra note 43, at 203-05 (discussing state reforms increasing the
right of taxpayers to vote on taxes).
85 A common public choice assumption is that in the political arena, as in the
economic arena, "people will allocate their limited means ... to maximize their personal satisfaction." Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Understanding(and Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A Response to Farberand Fickey, 66 TEX. L. REV. 993, 996 (1988);
see also JAMES M. BucHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 19-20
(1962) (noting the assumption that individuals act on the basis of the same overall
value scale when they participate in political and market activity).
A common critique of the public choice model is that it does not adequately
explain why voters vote at all, given the small likelihood that any individual result will
affect a collective decision. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Public Choice
Revisited, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1715, 1719 (1998). This critique, of course, becomes less
persuasive as the size of the group declines, as it does with respect to local governments, at least in small municipalities.
86 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
TEX. L. REV. 873, 893-901 (1987) (asserting that for both voters and legislators decisions are based not simply on an economic basis but by considering ideological factors as well).

2oo6]

PROPERTY

TAX

REASSESSMENT:

WHO NEEDS

IT?

voters?8 7 However significant these modeling difficulties may be at
the state or federal level, it seems plausible to assume that at the local
level, at least in those municipalities dominated by homeowners, selfinterest plays a dominant role in voter behavior. As William Fischel
has emphasized, homeowners typically have more equity in their
homes than in all other investments combined.8 8 As a result, homeowners are heavily focused on any impact local taxes and expenditures
might have on home prices. 89 If, as Part II.B suggests, municipal benefits and municipal taxes are to a large extent capitalized into home
values, homeowners will focus on the impact of these benefits and
taxes on their home values, largely to the exclusion of ideological or
other commitments that might manifest themselves in state and federal elections. 90 In a sense, municipal voters are akin to corporate
shareholders who seek to maximize share value, except that the costs
associated with exit focus municipal voters even more closely on monitoring local government decisions. 91
How does that self-interest operate when voters consider local
taxes and services? First, consider the case in which a municipality is
composed of identical properties, each of which benefits equally from
municipal services. In that municipality, taxpayers would presumably
support tax increases if and only if the services supported by new taxes
would generate more benefits than they entail costs. Each taxpayer
would face the same calculus and make her own assessment of benefits and costs. Our general assumption is that the majority of taxpay87 Perhaps the central insight of public choice theory, shared by scholars of disparate ideological castes, is that because of the difficulties of organizing pressure groups
around issues of mutual concern, small interest groups with intense preferences generally enjoy political advantages over larger groups with more diffuse preferences. See
generally BucH-NAN & TULLOCK, supra note 85, at 283-95 (discussing pressure groups

and their role in the political process);

MANCUR O.SON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE

ACTION 111-31 (1971) (discussing various theories of pressure groups).
88 FiSCHEL, supra note 64, at 4 (noting that 1990 data demonstrated that among
homeowners, median housing equity was eleven times as large as median liquid
assets).

89 Id. at 5-6, 74-75.
90 See id. at 18 (arguing that "mercenary concern with property values" motivates
behavior of homeowners with respect to local issues).
91 See id. at 19, 30, 74-75. Another significant difference between corporate
shareholders and municipal voters is that municipal governments allocate voting
rights per capita and not per share. Id. at 31. For general purpose local governments, the one-person/one-vote system now enjoys federal constitutional protection,
although states have some latitude to substitute a voting system based on ownership
for "special purpose" districts. See generally Briffault, supra note 11, at 345-80 (discuss-

ing the application of the proprietary government model for special purpose
districts).
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ers would make a better assessment than the minority, 92 and new taxes
would generally be imposed only in those situations where the bene93
fits created justify the taxes imposed.
Such a municipality is purely a hypothetical construct; disparities
are inevitable within any municipality. First, homes differ in value. If,
however, all municipal benefits are capitalized into home value, each
voter-taxpayer will still support only those tax increases that pay for
services that generate a surplus of benefits over costs. Those who own
more valuable homes will pay a larger share of the additional taxes,
but they will also obtain a proportionately larger share of the benefits
generated by those taxes.
Second, as we have seen, homeowners derive differential benefits
from the same services. Even if many municipal benefits are capitalized into home value, not all of them are. Other things being equal,
the homeowner with three children derives more benefits from the
public schools than the homeowner with no children or with only
one. 94 And once we sever the link between taxes and benefits, the
incentives change. Now, the voter-taxpayers who will reap more benefits than the taxes they expect to pay have an incentive to support
municipal benefits even when those benefits cost more than the aggregate value they generate for the municipality. 9 5 Conversely, voter92 For defense of this general assumption, see Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection
in Residential PrivateGovernments, 77 B.U. L. REV. 273, 289-90 (1997). For more extensive development, see Shmuel Nitzan & Uriel Procaccia, Optimal Voting Proceduresfor
Profit Maximizing Firms, 51 PUB. CHOICE 191, 198-202 (1986) (comparing the efficacy
of corporate voting procedures), and Zohar Goshen, Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate
Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 815 (2001); see also KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE ANDJUSTICE 167-69 (1983) (arguing that majority voting is a satisfactory social
choice mechanism if done under conditions of neutrality, anonymity, independence
from irrelevant alternatives, and positive response).
93 Although modeling voting behavior is fraught with difficulty, William Fischel
has argued that at the local government level, a median voter model does a good job
of predicting government behavior, even if voters never vote directly on the particular
issue in question. Fischel, supra note 76, at 49. As Fischel argues further, property
taxation "lines up other voters' incentives to make political decisions that are consistent with each voter's desire to maximize the value of his own home." Id. at 52.
94 See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Voting in a Local School Election: A Micro Analysis, 59
REv. ECON. & STAT. 30, 34, 40 (1977) (noting that a relationship exists between school
preferences and whether respondents had children in the school system).
95 This problem is arguably exacerbated when persons who own no property, and
therefore pay no tax, nevertheless vote. See Stark, supra note 43, at 214-16 (canvassing theories supporting, on efficiency grounds, a restriction of the franchise on tax
issues, but noting that franchise limitations would offend constitutionally mandated
one-person/one-vote principles). If, however, renters bear a share of the property tax
in the form of increased rents, this shifting of the tax burden ameliorates any free
rider problems.

2oo6]

PROPERTY

TAX

REASSESSMENT:

WHO

NEEDS

IT?

lO6 3

taxpayers who will pay more in taxes than they expect to derive in
benefits have an incentive to oppose the benefits even if the aggregate
value of those benefits exceed their aggregate costs.
Severance of the link between taxes and benefits does not guarantee inefficiency in provision of municipal services. Voter-taxpayers
may act altruistically, considering the overall benefit and cost to the
municipality rather than the impact on themselves alone. 96 Alternatively, enough voters may have personal interests aligned with aggregate welfare that even if each voter acts in self-interest, the voters as a
body are likely to reach efficient decisions. That is, if benefits are
strongly but imperfectly correlated with taxes, the voting mechanism
97
is still likely to generate efficient production of municipal services.
The more attenuated the connection between taxes and benefits,
however, the less likely the voting mechanism will generate efficient
results.
Return to the problem of tax assessments. When tax assessments
are purely arbitrary, the connection between taxes and benefits is severed completely. Suppose, for instance, that 30% of homeowners are
assessed at $200,000, while 70% are assessed at $20,000. If voters are
considering whether to pay for a service that will benefit each homeowner equally, voters are likely to approve the service even if costs
grossly exceed benefits; the 70% of homeowners who will bear approximately only 20% of the costs have strong financial incentives to
approve the expenditures. Conversely, if 30% of homeowners are assessed at $20,000, while 70% are assessed at $200,000, the voters
would be likely to disapprove the expenditures even if aggregate bene98
fits exceed their costs.
96 See id. at 245-47 (discussing the effect of deliberative processes on views and
voting behavior).
97 The point can also be expressed in terms of the "tax price" faced by voters.
The tax price has been defined as "the cost to an individual of increasing her per
capita share of local public spending by one dollar." Id. at 218. Stark contends that
"[w]here a community's median voter faces a low tax price, the referendum is likely
to exhibit a low level of taxpayer-regardingness, while the opposite would be true
where the median voter faces a higher tax price." Id. at 218-19. Where the median
voter faces a tax price higher than one dollar, however, inefficient decisions might
result when the median voter is paying more than her pro rata share of the community's aggregate tax burden-the problem discussed in the next paragraph of the text.
98 The assumption here is that a "median voter" model captures the decisionmaking process in local governments. That model assumes that the level of public services
will be determined as if a referendum among the voters is held on every issue of
concern to voters. Empirical evidence suggests that, within small municipalities, the
median voter model has greater predictive force than competitive models of govern-
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Moreover, Tiebout-style competition among municipalities will
not cure the problem. Even if inefficient provision of municipal services diminishes, in the aggregate, the attractiveness (and therefore
the purchase price) of homes within the municipality, many homeowners will not bear any share of that loss; and for others, any loss will
be more than offset by the relative benefits they receive (or relative
harms they suffer) from the municipality's disparate assessments.
Take an example. Suppose the municipality plans on borrowing
to build a new and larger gym at the local high school. Assume further that over the gym's useful life, it will cost the municipality
$1,000,000 per year but will yield only $500,000 per year in aggregate
benefits. If we assume, however, homeowners with identical homes,
30% assessed at $200,000 and 70% assessed at $20,000, the gym is
likely to be approved overwhelmingly. The low-assessment homeowners will derive 70% of the benefit of the gym ($350,000) but will bear
only 14/74 of its cost ($189,190). The result may significantly diminish the market value of the high-assessment homes but will only increase the value of the low-assessment homes.
This analysis suggests that providing an efficient level of municipal services requires a strong correlation between the benefits taxpayers receive and the taxes they pay. 99 That, in turn, suggests that purely
arbitrary assessments will generate inefficient municipal services.
Moreover, if all benefits from municipal services were capitalized into
home value, the analysis would suggest strongly that assessments equal
or proportional to current market value are most likely to generate
efficient provision of municipal services.
If, however, not all benefits are capitalized into home value, then
market value assessments also have the potential to generate inefficient municipal services. Suppose, for instance, the municipality is
considering whether to replace school textbooks every five years
rather than every ten years. The annual cost of more frequent replacement will be $200,000. Although some of the benefit will be capitalized into home value, some will not: homeowners with children in
school benefit more than homeowners without children, and homement behavior. FISCHEL, supra note 64, at 87-90. Evidence with respect to states and
larger municipalities is more equivocal. Id. at 90-92.
99 This might further suggest that property taxes should be replaced by user fees
to the extent that taxes deviate from actual benefits. This is problematic, however,
since the deviation seems stronger for education than for other municipal services
like police and fire protection. See supra Part II.A.1. Charging parents for the cost of
each child's use is problematic since school is mandatory. Perhaps related thereto,
charging parents the full cost could result in too little education since education has
positive societal externalities.
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owners with five children benefit more than homeowners with one. If
we assume that frequent replacement generates $300,000 in benefit,
only $100,000 of which is capitalized into home value, and if we also
assume that assessment is tied to market value, then homeowners without children in the schools are likely to vote against more frequent
replacement. If, on the other hand, assessments are lower for homeowners without school-age children-as they might be if assessment
were based on purchase price rather than current values-more
homeowners without school-age children would support the expenditure, because their share of the tax cost will be closer to the gain they
derive from increased home value. 10 0
To summarize, then, whenever the tax burden within a municipality is not distributed in proportion to benefits derived from municipal services, the risk of inefficient taxing and spending decisions
increases. 10 1 Voter self-interest departs from the aggregate municipal
interest, making it less likely that electoral decisions will maximize
group welfare. If all benefits from municipal services were capitalized
into home price, the efficiency argument for assessment based on
market value would be a powerful one (although market value assess10 2
ment would preclude redistributive taxation).
Conversely, if the benefits of municipal services are not capitalized into home price, efficiency considerations would support assessment based on purchase price, at least if purchase price roughly
provides tax relief to those who have been within the municipality
longer and who generally make less of a claim to the most expensive
of municipal services-the public schools.
Neither of these alternatives appears likely. If, as appears more
likely, benefits are partially capitalized, the optimal assessment base

will be somewhere between purchase price and current market value.
100 Cf FISCHEL, supra note 64, at 263-64 (discussing tax exemptions for senior
citizens and tax breaks for farmland as mechanisms to align benefits and burdens to
individual landowners with benefits and burdens for the municipality as a whole).
101 A similar concern might be raised in connection with redistribution attempts
at the federal level. This concern is more acute at the local level, however, for several
possible reasons: (1) there is more direct voting on items at the local level; (2) there is
more control-actual or perceived-at the local level; and/or (3) the presence of a
larger number of issues at the federal level reduces the impact of tax redistribution on
voters' choices.
102 Similarly, market value assessment might create liquidity difficulties for some
taxpayers. Deferral of taxes attributable to reassessments could, however, address liquidity concerns. See discussion infra Part III.D; cf. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 73, at 6
(arguing that while a "narrow view" of ability to pay would consider liquidity, a
"broader view . . . would look at people's material well-being without regard to
liquidity").
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The precise balance that will lead to the most efficient provision of
municipal services rests on empirical facts; a priori reasoning cannot
resolve the issue.
III.

PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH FREQUENT REASSESSMENT AT
CURRENT MARKET VALUE

The preceding Part developed a case-albeit an uneasy one-for
assessing real property at current market value. Fair market value,
however, is a moving target. If tax assessments at any moment are to
reflect that moment's value, the municipality must develop a mecha3
nism for keeping up with market values as those values change. 10
This Part examines the practical problems with a property tax system
that demands constant-or even frequent-reassessment to reflect
changes in market value.
A.

Cost

If tax assessment is to reflect current market value, the tax assessor (or a private firm engaged by the municipality to conduct the
reassessment) must examine all features of a parcel of property that
have an effect on market value. If, for instance, a modem kitchen, a

finished basement, or a new bathroom increases the value of a house
relative to others in the neighborhood, an inspection of the interior
of homes would be necessary to determine whether these features
10 4
exist.
A class of professionals-appraisers-has developed to conduct
these inspections and to make judgments about market value. Appraisers often inspect homes for banks deciding how much security
they will enjoy if they make a mortgage loan to a prospective pur-

chaser. Appraisers, however, do not work for nothing. When a municipality sets out to conduct a systematic reassessment of property
within its borders, the municipality will typically hire an appraisal firm
10 5
to conduct a "mass appraisal.'
Nassau County, a large suburban county on New York's Long Island, conducted a reassessment in 2002. The county contracted to
103 See generally Robinson, supra note 25, at 521-23 (discussing the
erty value assessment).
104

See INT'L Ass'N OF ASSESSING

OFFICERS,

history

of prop-

supra note 40, at 122 (noting that, par-

ticularly in older communities, "often the critical characteristics affecting value are
inside the house").
105 Id. at 113 (discussing process of mass appraisal); see also Cook, supranote 32, at
96-97 (comparing mass appraisal to fee appraisal).
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pay a private firm $34 million' 0 6 to reassess the county's 365,000 residential and 49,000 commercial parcelsl 07-a cost of about $80 per
parcel. Smaller municipalities, which cannot offer appraisers the
same economies of scale, will no doubt face a higher per-parcel
cost. 108

Moreover, the initial cost of the reassessment significantly understates its ultimate cost. Once the initial reassessment is "completed,"
the municipality must find a mechanism for resolving complaints or
appeals by property owners convinced that the initial reassessment
overvalued their parcels. Using Nassau County as an example, again,
128,000 property owners-about one-third of the county's total-filed
grievances with the county's assessment review commission. 10 9 Twice
as many homeowners contested their assessments as during the preceding year." 0 Processing these grievances is costly: Nassau County
increased the staff of its assessment review commission from one to
thirty-two, at an annual cost of nearly $2 million. 1 That cost, however, represents the tip of the iceberg. Homeowners themselves inevitably spend considerable sums hiring appraisers, lawyers, and firms
that specialize in assessment challenges 12-expenses that might be
worthwhile for individual homeowners, but that represent deadweight
13
losses from a social perspective.'
Moreover, if the goal is to keep assessments tied to current market value, these expenditures are not one-time costs. Housing values
change, relatively as well as absolutely. If they did not, there would be
106 Elissa Gootman, Nassau Audit Finds Flaws in Assessments of Businesses, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 2003, at B5.
107 Vivian S. Toy, Nassau Taxes May Be Fairer,but Protests Abound, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
2003, § 14LI, at 1.
108 The Town of Rye, New York, with a total of eleven thousand parcels, has recently engaged a private firm to reassess the town's properties for a cost ofjust under
one million dollars (about ninety dollars per parcel). Rubenstein, supra note 7.
109 Vivian S. Toy, Nassau Acts Quickly on Tax Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003,
§ 14L1, at 2.
110 Id.
111
Id. The county also spent $4,600,000 to upgrade its computer system to assist
in the valuation process. Id.
112 See Toy, supra note 107 (noting that tax challenge companies encourage homeowners to challenge assessments by offering contingent fees for processing
challenges).
113 See Zelinsky, supra note 33, at 881-82 (noting expenses). In addition, as Noel
Cunningham and Deborah Schenk have noted, whenever taxation depends on appraisal, the government tends to lose revenue because government does not have the
resources to compete with private litigants in disputes over appraisal. See Noel B.
Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A "Revolutionary"
Approach to Ownership, 47 TAx L. Rxv. 725, 743 n.78 (1992).
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little pressure to reassess. But the more frequent the reassessment,
the greater the cost to the municipality.
B. Accuracy
When a municipality conducts or commissions a reassessment, its
objective is to determine the market value of each parcel of land even
though the parcel's owner has not seen fit to place the parcel on the
market. The principal mechanism for determining market value of
residential homes is comparison with the selling price of homes that
have recently changed hands;1 1 4 for those homes, market value is rela15
tively clear.'
But if comparable sales are critical, the first question to consider
is sales during what period of time? Are five-year-old sales relevant to
current market value? Ten-year-old sales? The premise behind reassessment to current market value is that market value changes over
time; if values were constant, old assessments would be as good as new
ones. Use of a five-year-old sale as a benchmark for value creates two
problems: first, absolute values of all homes within the municipality
may have changed during that period; and second, the relative values
of homes within the municipality may have changed. Appraisers can
attempt to use an indexing factor as an imperfect way to deal with the
first problem. Indexing does not help at all with the second problem.
As a result, how to use past sales to determine current value remains a
16
matter that is part science, part art.'
The next difficulty is determining what homes are comparable
and what sorts of adjustments should be made for differences among
"comparable" homes. Objective features such as lot size, house square
footage, and number of bathrooms are easy to compare but play only
114 For investment properties, the comparable sale approach competes with two
others: the cost approach and the income approach, neither of which is well suited to
residential homes. For fuller descriptions of these approaches, see Cherokee W.
Wooley, Regulation of Real EstateAppraisers and Appraisals: The Effects of FIRREA, 43 EMORY L.J. 357, 362-63 (1994).
115 As Saul Levmore has noted, the quest for market value is not problem-free
even when the property has been subject to recent sale unless the market for the
property is active and not subject to fluctuations. Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation
Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REv. 771, 774 (1982). Levmore hypothesizes a
scenario in which a purchaser willing to pay one hundred thousand dollars or more
for a house the seller is then unwilling to sell, followed by an actual sale at ninety-five
thousand dollars just after the initial bidder has disappeared from the market.
Levmore asks, rhetorically, "[w]hat is the market value of the house?" Id. at 775-76.
116 See Wooley, supra note 114, at 391 ("The inherent subjectivity involved in the
appraisal of real property means that the process of appraising can never be an exact
science.").
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a partial role in determining market value. 117 Neighborhood quality
is often critical, but defining the relevant neighborhood is often diffiCult.118 "Curb appeal" is similarly difficult to measure, as is the quality
of initial building materials and the condition in which the home has
been maintained.1 19 Moreover, even with recent improvements, determining value is difficult; cost rarely provides a good estimate. A
homeowner who spends $10,000 on a new Sears kitchen may substantially increase the value of a $100,000 home; the same kitchen might
add no value at all to a $600,000 home because the typical buyer of
that home would rip it out in favor of more upscale cabinets, appliances, and countertops. Exacerbating the problem is the impact of
tax assessments on value. The sale price of a "comparable" home may
reflect an underassessment or overassessment of that home's value because, as the last subpart demonstrates, a significant portion of the tax
burden is typically capitalized into value. 120 This tax capitalization further complicates treatment of "comparable" homes for assessment
purposes.
Legal doctrine has long recognized the difficulties associated with
nonmarket determinations of market value. In a variety of areas, legal
doctrines have developed that avoid the need for speculative determi117 A treatise on appraisal techniques identifies twenty-seven variables (together
with a category labeled "other") as relevant to market value of a single-family home;
the treatise then notes that to generate reliable comparable sales data, the sample of
comparable homes must be at least four times as large as the number of variables
included in the model. INT'L ASS'N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, supra note 40, at 342-43.
118 See Cook, supra note 32, at 101 (noting that "[a]ppraisals can be very sensitive
to the arbitrary placement of boundaries" and that "during periods of sparse sales,
there are considerable problems with the modeling" of neighborhood differences).
119 Perhaps for this reason, the factors emphasized by most appraisers are style of
the house, size of the lot, age and size of the building, number of bedrooms and
bathrooms, and terms of the sale. WILLIAM L. VENTOLO, JR. & MARTHA R. WILLIAMS,
FUNDAMENTALS OF REAL ESTATE APPRmsAL 129 (8th ed. 2001). Valuation difficulties
remain notwithstanding advances in valuation techniques. See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra
note 6, at 2199, 2219-20. For an illustration of current valuation inequities, see
Gordon Russell, Dubious Value, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Apr. 4, 2004, at
Al (detailing current unequal assessments in New Orleans).
120

Cf Vivian S. Toy, All the Rage: FightingNassau Assessments, N.Y.

TIMES,

Mar. 7,

2004, § 14LI, at I (noting a problem with one set of reassessments).
One thing that the reassessments did not take into account is that the
market value of a home depends in part on how much tax it pays, making
the assessment rolls something of a moving target. For example, a home
whose taxes were historically low before the reassessment is likely to be assessed as if its taxes were still low, because the comparable sales data used in
the process predates the reassessment.
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nations of market value. Perhaps the most basic of these-although
certainly not the only one-is the doctrine that because real property
is unique, a contract vendee is entitled to specific performance of a
contract to sell real property. 121 Against this background, then, it is
hardly surprising that experts criticize the accuracy of real property
assessments, even when municipalities attempt to keep them
current.122
C.

Politics

The thrust of the preceding subpart is that even trained appraisers seeking to determine market value are ultimately doomed to significant inaccuracy. In fact, however, tax assessment is a political
process; the ultimate responsibility for assessments rests on the shoulders of elected officials, and they have incentives to minimize any
123
damage to their political careers that reassessment might generate.
The extreme case involves out-and-out corruption; favored individuals receive low assessments in return for the benefits they confer
on assessors. 124 The frequency of this kind of corruption is difficult to
detect, because other taxpayers have limited incentive to monitor this
sort of "sweetheart" assessment. A landowner concerned about his
own tax burden will be much more likely to fight about a $25,000
overassessment of his own parcel than a $250,000 underassessment of
someone else's parcel. Because the burden of the underassessment is
shared by so many taxpayers, each of whom suffers very little, none of
them have much reason to challenge the underassessment.
Undoubtedly more common than out-and-out corruption is the
ordinary political desire to please constituents. Reassessment inevitably leaves many taxpayer-voters unhappy with their assessments. Polit121

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 360 cmt. e (1979).
Contracts for the sale of land have traditionally been accorded a special
place in the law of specific performance. A specific tract of land has long
been regarded as unique and impossible of duplication by the use of any
amount of money. Furthermore, the value of land is to some extent speculative. Damages have therefore been regarded as inadequate to enforce a duty

to transfer an interest in land ....

Id.
122 See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 115, at 777 (quoting census statistics indicating
that a small percentage of municipalities kept dispersion ratios for valuation of nonfarm houses within fifteen percent of the median assessment ratio).
123 See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 2203 (linking the "considerable political manipulation" to the valuation difficulties).
124 Cf Russell, supra note 119 (discussing resignation of the chair of the state tax
commission after he and a number of assessors "went on annual fishing junkets paid
for by an energy firm with business before the commission").
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ical officials will find it attractive in that circumstance to admit the
possibility of error, especially when the error can be attributed to
someone else, here the outside firm commissioned to conduct the reassessment. That, in turn, will typically lead to development of a process for reviewing initial assessments, generally in the name of
accuracy and fairness.
Once a review process is in place, however, the potential for compounding errors is at least as great as for correcting them. Typically, a
large percentage of taxpayers who seek review of their assessments will
receive reductions.12 5 One explanation for the large percentage of
reductions is that the original assessment process was terribly flawed,
generating a large percentage of errors. If that was the problem, the
review process would not restore equity; those taxpayers who do not
challenge their assessments would remain burdened by their flawed
assessments.
Another explanation for a high percentage of reductions-the
one most likely to be offered by municipal officials-is that the taxpayers who seek review are those most likely to have been unfairly assessed.12 6 Those who did not seek review were disproportionately the
taxpayers who were treated fairly in the reassessment process; hence,
they had no reason to complain and small likelihood of success.
In fact, however, this explanation is about as plausible as the contention that students who complain about grades are disproportionately those who have suffered unfair treatment. The more likely
explanation is that the taxpayers who challenge their assessments are
disproportionately those who have the savvy to understand that they
have little to lose; review processes rarely provide for the possibility of
increased assessment. 12 7 Moreover, reviewing these assessments in iso125 For instance, in a recent revaluation of properties within the Town of Rye, New
York, twenty-five percent of property owners requested a review of their assessments,
and two-thirds of those received a reduction. Hannan Adely, Rye Town Residents Divided on Accuracy of PropertyReviews, THEJ. NEWS (Westchester County, N.Y.),June 13,
2004, at lB.
126 Cf Some Spring Valley Homes Get Tax Reduction, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2002, at B7
(quoting director of the District of Columbia's assessment office, who justified reducing assessments only for landowners who complained about possible chemical contamination and not for similarly situated landowners who did not complain, by
asserting that, in the Post's words, "those who did not appeal their bills are presumably content with the assessment on their properties").
127 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 525(3)(b) (McKinney 2000) ("The final
assessed valuation or taxable assessed valuation of real property may be the same as or
less than the original assessment.").
Commercial landowners tend to challenge assessments in far greater numbers
than residential homeowners, both because they have more at stake and because they
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lation, without reviewing the assessments of more passive taxpayers, is
hardly likely to increase overall accuracy; the new reductions may
harm taxpayers who previously had no cause to complain but who
now find themselves overassessed relative to their more aggressive
12 8
neighbors.
D. Liquidity
Within the income tax literature, a standard defense of the realization requirement focuses on taxpayer liquidity: if a taxpayer is required to pay tax on gains before the taxpayer sells the asset, the
taxpayer may be forced to sell the asset in order to pay the tax. 129 A
realization requirement assures that taxpayer's tax liability comes at a
time when the taxpayer has cash with which to pay the tax.
Liquidity is of particular concern when the property tax is at is1
sue. 30 In an income tax system that relies heavily on withholding, tax
generally is paid out of income the taxpayer has just earned. Similarly, a taxpayer has no occasion to pay sales tax unless the taxpayer
has liquid assets with which to make a purchase. By contrast, when
property tax comes due, there is no assurance that the taxpayer will
have available a stream of money that bears some proportion to the
31
tax due.
To some extent, the liquidity problem is mitigated by the taxpayer-homeowner's ability to plan at the time of purchase. When a
person buys a home, she knows and accounts for her prospective
property tax liability, just as she accounts for her monthly mortgage
payments. Indeed, the mortgagee bank will generally take tax liability
into account in determining the size of mortgage for which the purchaser qualifies, and the mortgagee bank may require the purchaser
tend to have greater sophistication about the review process. Thus, in Chicago, about
96% of the dollar value of all assessment appeals have involved commercial property.
Fran Spielman, Daley Wants Tax Review Role, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 4, 2002, at 8.
128 For a discussion of the parallel problem with respect to law school grades, see
Stewart E. Sterk, Information Production and Rent-Seeking in Law School Administration:
Rules and Discretion, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1141, 1152 (2003).
129 See, e.g., David Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1549, 1594
(1998); David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposalfor Accrual Taxation,
134 U. PA. L. REv. 1111, 1118, 1167-76 (1986); Daniel Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of
Realization and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAx L. REv. 1, 12-13
(1992).
130 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 5, at 86 (asserting the property tax's failed connection to liquidity is a "further problem . . . which is central to its disfavor with
taxpayers").
131 See Mary LaFrance, ConstitutionalImplications of Acquisition-Value Real Property
Taxation: The Elusive Rational Basis, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 817, 839 (1994).
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to set up an escrow account to assure that those taxes are paid on a
monthly basis. Modest annual property tax increases-like modest increases in the price of consumer goods-are unlikely to raise significant liquidity concerns.
Reassessment, by contrast, can significantly increase a homeowner's tax burden when the homeowner has no ready source of
funds available to pay the increase. 13 2 Liquidity can be especially serious as a problem for long-term homeowners, who made purchasing
decisions based on incomes and tax burdens that no longer reflect
133
current ability to pay.
One answer to this liquidity problem is to suggest that homeowners without liquid assets to meet current tax burdens should move to
homes and communities whose prices and tax structures are more in
line with their own liquid resources. That answer, however, is politically unpopular; no local politician concerned about reelection would
suggest that moving out is the best answer for local residents facing
liquidity problems.13 4 Moreover, involuntary relocations involve significant costs. People who retain homes that are larger than they
need are not necessarily acting irrationally; social networks, memories,
time, and money spent tailoring a particular home to one's own preferences combine to make a home more valuable to its current occupant than it would be to a similarly situated prospective purchaser.
That subjective value is lost when liquidity problems force a long-term
resident to relocate.
As a result, the more common municipal response to liquidity
problems is a reduction in tax burdens for long-term residents
through "circuit breaker" provisions of one sort or another. These
35
provisions-limited exemptions and income-related tax rebates1
do not typically result in a reduced assessment of property value, but
132 To the extent higher reassessments are matched by higher home values, some
taxpayers might be able to borrow against the appreciation to fund the property tax
increase. This is not a comprehensive solution to liquidity concerns, however. The
lack of an attendant cash flow increase to support a traditional mortgage might force
the taxpayer to utilize a reverse mortgage with high charges. Cf Youngman, supra
note 37, at 747-48 (discussing how taxpayers underutilize state deferral programs in
part due to their high charges).
133 See Gold, supra note 34, at 155.
134 See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 2207 ("[I]t is not a politically compelling defense
of the local property tax... that homeowners' liquidity complaints may indicate that
they are overhoused.").
135 For a comprehensive discussion of circuit-breakers, see Gold, supra note 34, at
148-58.

See also William Duncombe & John Yinger, Alternative Paths to Property Tax

Relief in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LocAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE, supra note 14, at 243,
253 (discussing use of circuit-breaker programs among the states); LaFrance, supra
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they do achieve a practically equivalent result: they divorce the homeowner's tax burden from the value of her property. The consequence
is that even if a municipality manages to overcome all of the costs and
inaccuracies associated with assessment at current market value, the
overall tax burden is not proportional to market value.
IV.

REFORM PROPOSAL: DEFERRAL OF REVALUATION UNTIL SALE

The current property tax choices leave unsatisfactory tradeoffs. A
system that bases tax assessments on an owner's initial purchase
price-a "purchase price" approach-raises significant equity, efficiency, and perception concerns. A system that directly links taxes to
current market value reduces these concerns in theory, but could introduce voting distortions of its own. Moreover, administrative and
political pitfalls riddle existing attempts to value homes prior to sale.
To address these difficulties, we propose a new property tax structure which combines the most attractive features of the purchase price
and current market value approaches. In essence, we propose a system that reassesses property only upon sale-avoiding the cost, valuation, and liquidity difficulties that plague property tax systems that
focus exclusively on current market value. At the same time, we propose a tax adjustment at the time of sale that recaptures from the
seller most of the tax benefits the seller received from below-market
assessments.
We recognize that in a number of states, implementation of our
proposal would require not only legislation, but constitutional amendment. And in other states, a system that reassesses property upon sale
might, as a practical matter, require adjustment of constitutional limitations on local taxing power. 13 6 We do not consider in this Article
the precise steps necessary to enact our proposal in each of the fifty
states.

note 131, at 840-42 (discussing tax deferrals and exemption policies for
homeowners).
136 Some states limit local taxing power to a percentage of property value. See, e.g.,
CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (a) (requiring property tax to be assessed as a percentage of
fair market value); WASH CONsT. art. VII, § 2 (requiring supermajority to impose tax
in excess of one percent of fair value). If value for property tax purposes were fixed at
purchase price-an amount often less than current value-existing constitutional
limitations might begin to constrain municipalities not constrained under existing
law.
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The Initial Reform Proposal: Mechanics

Our reform proposal uses both purchase price and current market value. Each home would be reassessed upon sale, and the assessment would then remain constant for as long as the taxpayerhomeowner owns the home. When the home is sold or the homeowner dies, the homeowner or her estate would become liable for additional tax based on the home's increase in value. In effect, the tax
liability for each ownership year would be redetermined at sale by
averaging the original purchase and final sales prices. Additional tax
would be due on sale equal to the difference between (1) what the
taxpayer would have paid each year had the home been assessed at
the average between purchase and sale prices, and (2) what the tax137
payer actually paid each year.
Example 1. H buys a home for $100,000 on January 1, 2001, and
sells it for $500,000 on January 1, 2021. The tax rate equals 1% for
each year. H pays $1000 tax in each of years 2001-2020, based on
the $100,000 historical cost. H pays $40,000 additional tax on sale
in 2021, calculated as follows. The average value of the home during the twenty-year period was $300,000. H owes $2000 back taxes
for each of the twenty ownership years: the difference between the
$3000 per year H would have paid with a $300,000 assessment and
the $1000 per year H actually paid.
B.
1.

The Initial Reform Proposal. Improvements on Current Options

Improvements over Assessment Based Only on Initial Purchase
Price
a.

The Relationship Between Benefits and Taxes

Recall that a pure purchase price approach significantly deviates
from the benefits justification for the property tax by ignoring benefits capitalized into home price. That is, many of the benefits generated by municipal services are capitalized into the current market
value of homes within the municipality. When assessments depart significantly from current market value, as they do when assessments are
based solely on purchase price, taxes will not accurately reflect benefits received.
As we have seen, a discontinuity between taxes and benefits generates a moral hazard problem when taxpayers vote on municipal services. In particular, taxpayers whose purchase price assessments are
137 This assumes the typical case where the home is sold at a gain. Refunds could
be provided to homeowners who sell at a loss.
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too low have incentives to vote to increase municipal services even
when the cost of those services will exceed their benefits. While tax
rate caps address this concern, they also impede efficient spending
13
decisions. s
Our proposal addresses this problem without inefficient rate caps
by assuring that long-term homeowners will bear more of the cost of
municipal services. At the same time, the additional taxes will be paid
at a time when assets (the sale price) are available to pay those
1 39
taxes.
b.

Ability To Pay

If the property tax were treated as an ability-to-pay tax, pure
purchase price disregards a clear accession to wealth in its very
base.1 40 The value of one's property is certainly an element of one's
ability to pay. Our proposal includes that value in the tax base but
postpones the tax until sale, minimizing ability-to-pay arguments
41
based on taxpayer liquidity.1
c.

Inefficient Incentives To Retain Homes with Appreciated
Value

A property tax based purely on the owner's purchase price distorts selling decisions, because the sale of an appreciated home increases the tax burden, thus encouraging retention of appreciated
homes to avoid the tax increase which accompanies a sale. 1 42 As evi138 See supra text accompanying notes 22-24 (discussing California's Proposition
13).
139 Voters might discount future tax liabilities for a variety of reasons. As discussed
infra text accompanying note 159, this might be desirable since benefits and value do
not correlate perfectly.
140 Recall the broader definition of ability to pay, which looks to material wellbeing irrespective of the liquidity of assets.
141 See Miller, supra note 5, at 130-32 (critiquing the purchase price approach on
equity grounds); id. at 86 (noting liquidity problems with value-based taxes).
142 One example of this distortion is the tax incentive to make intergenerational
transfers to family members under California's Proposition 13. See Joan M.
Youngman, The Hardest Challenge for Value-Based Property Taxes: Part II, 16 ST. TAX
NoTEs 1393, 1395 (1999). On the flip side, a pure purchase price approach encourages sales when home value decline.
Nada Wasi and Michelle J. White have conducted an empirical study that documents the tendency of pure purchase-price assessments to increase the tenure length
of property owners. Their study concludes that in California, tenure length of homeowners increased substantially after enactment of Proposition 13 relative to tenure
length changes in Texas and Florida during the same period. Nada Wasi & Michelle
J. White, Property Tax Limitations and Mobility: The Lock-In Effect of California'sProposition
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denced by the following examples, while our proposal would not eliminate all such distortion, it would significantly reduce the concern
143
compared to the purchase price approach.
Assume H buys a home for $1,000,000 on December 31, 2000,
and the home appreciates at a constant rate of 7% per year. After one
year, on January 1, 2002, the home will be worth $1,070,000, and five
years later, on January 1, 2007, the home will be worth about
$1,500,000.144 Suppose H considers selling the home on January 1,
2002. Assume the property tax is a constant 1% during that period.
What property tax implications will sale have, first if the tax is based
solely on purchase price, and second, under our approach?
Example 2A (PurchasePrice Approach). If H retains the original home

until 2007, his tax during that period will be a constant $10,000 per
year. By contrast, if H sells the home on January 1, 2002, and buys a
home of equal value on the same date, H will pay an additional
$700 in tax for each of the five years between January 1, 2003, and
January 1, 2007, for a total of $3500. That is, H is $3500 better off if
H retains his original home, even if he would prefer another home
of identical market value.
Example 2B (ProposedApproach). If H retains the original home until

2007, his tax during the six-year period will be $10,000 per year. At
sale, H will pay an additional tax based on the average value of his
home during the period. Because the average value was $1,250,000,
he will pay the difference between $12,500 and $10,000 for each of
the six years, for a total of $15,000. His total tax payments for the
six years, including the catch-up payment at sale, will be $75,000.

If H sells the original home on January 1, 2002 and purchases
one of equivalent value, his tax for the last five years will be $10,700
per year, reflecting the purchase price of his new house. In addition,
he will pay two adjustments, one upon the sale of each house. At the
sale of the first house, he will pay an additional $350 (1% of the difference between the average price of his house during the one year he
owned it and the purchase price of that house). At the sale of the
13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11108, 2005), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/Wl 1108.
143 Elimination of such distortion generally would require a precise revaluation
for each year, and a precise interest charge for any deferred tax payments. See infra
Part IV.C.2. This distortion also would be eliminated by an approach which disregarded completely sales of a home in determining its tax charge (such an approach
would raise other concerns, of course). As such, selling distortion also arises under
periodic revaluation assuming it gives weight to a sale of the home in question during
the interim period.
144 $1,000,000 x (1.07)6 = $1,500,730. The example includes rounding for ease of
calculation.
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second house he will pay an additional $10,750 (1% of the difference
between the average price of the house during the five years he owned
it and the purchase price of that house, multiplied by the five years he
owned the house). His total tax payments for the six years will be
$74,600.
The proposed approach eliminates most of the distortion associated with tax assessments based solely on initial purchase price. The
incentive to retain a home whose value has appreciated largely disappears; in the example, the taxpayer who retains the home actually
pays somewhat more tax (although the actual burden may be no
larger, or somewhat less, because more of the tax is deferred).
d.

Perception of Unfairness

Finally, we have seen that the purchase price approach generates
a perception of unfairness, which lingers even if tax capitalization
reduces the actual inequities. The proposed approach addresses that
perception, because all homeowners should recognize that those
whose assessments are now low will make up the difference at a later
date.
2.

Improvements over Assessments Based on Current Market Value
a.

Valuation Difficulties

As we have seen, periodic revaluations-annual or otherwisealso remain unsatisfactory notwithstanding their superficial appeal as
a response to the purchase price problems. As evidenced by extensive
experience, valuation attempts prior to sale raise significant difficulties: they are costly, unreliable, and beset by political problems. Our
approach avoids these problems by eliminating the need for appraisals or assessments.
b.

Liquidity

One of the principal criticisms of assessments based entirely on
current market value is that homeowners may not have the liquid resources necessary to pay the tax. These liquidity concerns often lead
to selective exemptions and deferral opportunities, which furthers the
uneven, at times arbitrary, application of the tax. Our approach eliminates liquidity concerns by postponing payment until a pot of
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money-the sale proceeds-becomes available for payment of tax ob145
ligations potentially unforeseen at time of purchase.
c.

The Connection Between Taxes and Benefits

To the extent that benefits associated with municipal services are
not perfectly capitalized into home values, assessments based on current market value will not reflect benefits received by taxpayers and
have the potential to introduce moral hazard problems into the voting
process. Our proposal ameliorates this problem by delaying the tax
obligation of long-term homeowners until they sell their current
homes.
As we have seen, long-term homeowners assessed at full market
value often have incentives to vote down efficient expenditures-particularly school expenditures-to the extent that the benefits associated with those expenditures are not capitalized into current market
value. If, however, they discount the burden of future taxation-as is
likely if liquidity is a significant concern-those incentives are reduced somewhat.

1 46

In addition to lesser current tax payments, the real tax charge
would move towards historical cost and away from an exclusive focus
on current value if no interest were charged on recalculated back
taxes. 14 7 This might appeal on equity grounds. Recall how historical
cost and value each might correlate positively with the benefits and
1 48
redistribution theories, albeit with varying degrees of precision.
C. Possible Refinements
Our proposal would not "solve" all problems with the existing options. In fact, no proposal can reconcile all competing concerns even
145 Recall how current deferral options provide a far less comprehensive liquidity
response. See discussion supra note 132 and accompanying text. In addition, these
current law approaches do not address revaluation concerns.
146 Similarly, the deferred payment addresses the concern to the extent voters do
not perceive fully the notion of future tax liabilities. Cf Stark, supra note 43, at
224-25 ("[I]n terms of the potential effect on the local residents voting behavior, an
unperceived burden is indistinguishable from no burden at all.").
147 We consider below the merits of an interest charge on recalculated back taxes.
See infra Part IV.C.2. We analyze the respective merits of either no interest charge or
an interest charge at the government's low isk-free rate. The real tax charge would
move towards historical cost and away from value in either case as owners of appreciated homes would receive the equivalent of a below-market loan from the
government.
148 See discussion supraPart II. Notwithstanding such movement towards benefits,
the case is more mixed whether this would address inefficient voting decisions. See
discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
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in theory. There is inevitable tension between the benefits and abilityto-pay theories. And when benefits diverge from value, tension can
arise between efficient voting decisions and efficient selling decisions
by homeowners. Our proposal nonetheless remains a significant improvement upon current law. We turn next to some refinements
which might further improve current law.
Mindful thatjurisdictions might resolve differently the competing
tradeoffs, our guidance here generally takes the form of recommendations rather than definitive conclusions. For instance, some choices
would move our system more in the direction of a pure value tax.
Those options might be more attractive in large urban coastal areas
where appreciation constitutes a higher proportion of a typical homeowner's return from the housing investment. 149 More generally, jurisdictions might balance differently the equity and efficiency tensions
above, as well as administrative issues. In sum, our analysis above supports some direct link between the property tax and fair market value,
but it does not necessarily compel the closest possible connection.
And our proposal provides that strong, yet flexible, link.
1.

Gain Allocation

Our initial proposal retroactively assessed a new and constant
property value for each year, equal to purchase price plus half the
gain on sale. As demonstrated above, our proposal, even in its simplest form, would significantly improve upon current law. We believe,
however, that two potentially attractive alternatives might more accurately approximate actual property values during the ownership
period.
a.

Constant Return Assumption

The approach we have used so far focuses on the average value of
the home during the owner's period of ownership. The average value
approach effectively assumes that the home appreciated in equal dol149

Professor Chris Mayer suggests an analogy to the stock market. "'In [some

"income stock" cities like] Houston, you get a lot of your return from current consumption and less in appreciation. And in [other "growth stock" cities like] San Francisco and New York, you get less in current consumption and more in appreciation.'"
Jonathan Clements, Renting vs. Buying: Home Shoppers Should Plan To Stay Putfor a Long
Time, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2004, at Dl (quoting Professor Mayer and listing Boston,

Denver, Los Angeles, New York, San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle as in the
"growth stock" category).
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lar increments for each year that the owner owned the home. 150 In
fact, however, it is more likely that the home appreciated at a constant
percentage rate during that time. As illustrated by the following example, a long-term homeowner typically would owe more tax under
the average value approach than if we assume appreciation at a constant rate.1 51 That result follows because the average value approach
allocates too much appreciation to the early years of the owner's tenure. That problem can be cured by assuming the home appreciates at
a constant rate during the period between purchase and sale. 152 The
following examples illustrate the difference.
Assume H buys a home for $100,000 on December 31, 2000, and
the home appreciates at a constant rate of 10% per year. H sells the
home for $259,375 on January 1, 2011.153 Assume the property tax is

a constant 1% at all times. How much tax would H owe, first under
our proposal with an average value assumption, and second, with an
assumption that the property appreciates at a constant rate?
Example 3A (Proposed Approach/Average Value Assumption). H pays
$1000 tax in each of years 2001-2010, based on the $100,000 histori-

cal cost. At sale on January 1, 2011, H will pay an additional tax
based on the average value of his home during the period. Because
the average value was $179,688, he will pay the difference between

$1797 and $1000 for each of the ten years, for a total of $7970. His
total tax burden for the ten years will be $17,970.

Example 3B (Proposed Approach/Constant Return Assumption). H pays
$1,000 tax in each of years 2001-2010 based on historical cost, just
like Example 3A. I's additional tax on theJanuary 2011 sale will be
based on the following year-end values: $110,000 (year 01);
$121,000 (year 02); $133,100 (year 03); $146,410 (year 04);
$161,051 (year 05); $177,156 (year 06); $194,871 (year 07);
$214,358 (year 08); $235,795 (year 09); $259,375 (year 10). These
values would be assumed based solely on purchase and sales price,
thereby avoiding the pre-sale valuation problems. H would owe
$7,533 on sale: $100 + $210 + $331 + $464 + $611 + $772 + $949 +
$1144 + $1358 + $1594. -'s total tax burden for the ten years will
be $17,533.
150 This results when the tax rate is constant. For an analysis of tax rate changes,
see infra Part IV.C.3.
151 This ignores time value of money issues. A possible interest charge is discussed
infra Part IV.C.2. In certain cases, a homeowner could owe less tax, such as where the
home is owned for a short time period. See infra Part IV.C.2.
152 The original issue-discount provisions of the federal income tax adopt this concept for bonds which defer some or all of the interest. I.R.C. §§ 1271-1275 (2000).
153 $100,000 x (1.1)' ° = $259,375. The calculation is rounded to the nearest
dollar.
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What should we make of this difference? On the one hand, a
$437 differential might not seem overly significant on these numbers.
On the other hand, the deviation becomes more pronounced as the
1 54
ownership period or the annual rate of return increases.
In most circumstances, the constant return assumption better reflects the usual appreciation path. 155 Constant return's theoretical advantage must be balanced against administrative concerns,
however. 1 56 Although a simple computer program could determine
the constant return liability by plugging in purchase price, sales price,
and years of ownership, a typical homeowner might have difficulty determining his own liability and/or understanding the basis of the
charge.
b.

Adjusted Constant Return Assumption

The constant return assumption better approximates value than
the assumption of appreciation in equal dollar increments. The actual appreciation path, however, is likely to be somewhat bumpy. The
constant return assumption results in too much (little) tax relative to
value where the home experiences disproportionate appreciation late
(early) in the holding period. Most localities have data about general
housing price patterns. This data could be used to improve the annual assessments without opening up pre-sale valuation concerns. 157
Again, the theoretic appeal must be balanced against administrative
costs, mindful that even simpler versions of our proposal would significantly improve upon current law. If adjusted constant return is rejected on administrative grounds, unadjusted constant return
154 A homeowner could in fact pay less tax under the average value assumption
due to a relatively short holding period and/or low rate of return.
155 The following formulas generalize the difference between the two approaches.
The constant return assumption would require the following payment on sale: the
sum of [(1 + R)N - 1] x Px T, as Nranges from 1 to the number of ownership years,
where N is the number of ownership years, P is the purchase price, and R is the
annual rate of return. In contrast, average value would include: 2 x Nx [(1 + R)N - 1]
x Px T.
156 We focus on maximizing the correlation to a pure value-based tax since unlike
the interest charge analysis, see infra Part 1V.C.2, value deviations do not move the tax
liability towards a possible alternative desideratum such as purchase price. See discussion infra note 170 and accompanying text.
157 For example, H purchases a home in year 0 for $100,000 and sells in year 3 for
$200,000. The general housing market in the locality increased by 20% in year 1,
40% in year 2, and 10% in year 3. The expected value of the house would have been
$120,000 after one year, $168,000 after two years, and $184,800 after three years. Because the actual value at sale was $200,000, the expected value for each year would be
multiplied by (200,000/184,800).
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Interest on Deferred Taxes

We now consider whether homeowners should pay interest on
deferred taxes. Starting with the assumption that the property tax
should be based on current value, long-term owners would remain tax
advantaged absent an interest charge, even if assumed and actual annual property values perfectly correlate. This results since the failure
to charge interest on back taxes provides an interest-free loan
equivalent to the owner of an appreciated home. An interest charge
on the deferred taxes therefore appeals as the natural response.
As suggested earlier, however, some benefits-particularly public
schools-are not fully capitalized into home price, and the benefits
received by long-term residents may not correlate with home value. If
so, foregoing interest on deferred taxes might better align the real tax
burden and benefits. On the other hand, in a world of revenue neutrality, an interest charge reduces the annual taxes paid by residents of
the municipality. If we assume that liquidity is a concern for many of
the long-term residents, especially those who have retired, immediate
tax relief may be as significant, or more significant, than the prospect
of an interest charge not payable until death or sale. For these residents, saving a dollar now may seem preferable to saving more at
death or sale. In addition, the connection to efficient voting is somewhat mixed even for those who act on the basis of real tax charges;
i.e., an interest charge might lower the overall real burden for some
59
long-term owners.1
The theoretic appeal of an interest charge must be balanced
against practical concerns. In theory, interest arguably should be
charged at the individual taxpayer's borrowing rate, taking into ac158 Average value could minimize deviations relative to (unadjusted) constant return in certain cases such as where a home experienced unusually heavy appreciation
during the early part of the holding period. (Unadjusted constant return would result in too little tax, and the average value excess tax would serve as an offset.) Absent
some showing that average value is more likely to offset, rather than exacerbate, uneven appreciation deviations, (unadjusted) constant return's greater plausibility
should trump.
159 Even with the resulting higher tax rates, long-term owners generally benefit
from the lack of an interest charge since the deferral benefits increase with the deferral period. An interest charge would reduce a long-term owner's current tax burden
at some point, as the selling date nears. Accordingly, foregoing an interest chargewith the corollary higher rates-could exacerbate the voting concern for long-term
owners who have reached this crossover point.
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count variations over time. Individual-specific borrowing rates are impractical, however, and might restore liquidity concerns, especially for
long-term homeowners with poor credit.
After balancing the theoretic and practical concerns, we generally
recommend an interest charge at the U.S. government's low risk-free
rate. 160 In recommending the interest charge, we are particularly
mindful of the income tax's legendary difficulties with interest-free
deferral. 61 Nonetheless, we recognize that some jurisdictions might
prefer to drop the interest charge, perhaps to move the real tax burden more towards purchase price. This might appeal moreso for equity reasons than efficiency reasons. 162 In this regard, interest-free
deferral might be a lesser concern under the property tax due to dif163
ferences between the property and income taxes.
160 For a limited argument supporting the risk-free rate in theory in a comparable
context under the federal income tax, see Cynthia Blum, New Role for the Treasury:
ChargingInterest on Tax Deferral Loans, 25 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 1, 15 (1988) (noting that
taxpayers holding risk-free treasuries would liquidate those assets to fund earlier tax
payments). Separately, the federal AMT might offset concerns that a risk-free interest
charge is too low. The AMT denies the federal tax deduction for property taxes in
certain cases, which is more likely as the amount of property taxes in any year increases. I.R.C. §§ 55, 56(b) (1) (A) (ii) (West Supp. 2005). Absent some adjustment,
our proposal would increase the likelihood of an AMT disallowance given the lumpsum payment at sale, and such AMT denial could be viewed as an implicit charge for
deferral.
161 E.g., Blum, supra note 36. Retrospective approaches have been suggested
under the income tax, primarily to address interest-free deferral. E.g., Alan
Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 167 (1991); Blum,
supra note 36. Setting aside the interest charge, retrospective allocations are more
important under the property tax than under the income tax since the property tax
applies a relatively low rate on a repetitive basis.
162 While dropping the interest charge generally would move the real tax burden
towards purchase price, the impact on voting is unclear. See supra notes 146-148 and
accompanying text. This nonetheless might be desired on equity grounds since both
purchase price and value might correlate positively with the benefits and redistribution theories. An interest charge at the low risk-free rate similarly moves the real tax
burden towards purchase price, albeit to a lesser extent.
163 Interest-free deferral raises three categories of problems under the realization
income tax: (1) indefinite gain deferral by avoiding realizations on appreciated assets;
(2) selective loss transactions, particularly utilization of non-economic losses to offset
real income; and (3) capital gain conversion transactions which transmute ordinary
income into low-rate capital gains. A property tax on homes does not implicate the
latter two, and the first might be less problematic due to greater difficulty in cashing
out without an actual sale. Cf I.R.C. § 1259 (2000) (attempting to deal with "constructive sales" on appreciated financial positions). Nonetheless, some concern does
remain given the possibility of devices such as long-term leases. Special avoidance
rules could deal with this problem; e.g., long-term leases could be treated as sales,
with the sales price determined from the lease's revenue stream. Also, the federal
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Tax Rate Changes

We have so far assumed a constant tax rate. We now consider two
alternatives for rate changes: actual versus average rates. Each year's
reassessed amount at sale could be multiplied by such year's actual
rate or the average rate over the ownership period. As evidenced by
the following examples, actual tax rates work better in conjunction
with constant return assumptions than average value.
Assume H buys a home for $100,000 on December 31, 2000, and
the home appreciates at a constant rate of 50% per year. H sells the
home for $506,250 on January 1, 2005.164 Assume the property tax
rate is 1% for 2001-2003 and 3% for 2004. How much tax would H
owe under the alternative average value or constant return assumptions, first using actual tax rates, and second, utilizing the average tax
rate?
Example 4A (Actual Tax Rates). H pays $1000 tax in each of years

2001-2004 based on historical cost. -'s additional tax on the 2005
sale depends on whether the constant return or average value assumption is adopted. Average value would add $203,125 to the tax
base for each year.' 6 5 Howes $2031 for years 2001-2003 and $6094
for 2004, for an aggregate $8125 payment on sale. A constant return assumption would add $50,000; $125,000; $237,500; and
$406,250 to the base for years 2001-2004 respectively. Accordingly,
66
H would owe $16,312.50 on sale.'
Example 4B (Average Tax Rate). H pays $1000 tax in each of years

2001-2004 based on historical cost, just like Example 4A. The additional tax on the 2005 sale will now be based on the average 1.5%
rate. 16 7 Accordingly, H would owe $3047 for each of the four years
under an average value assumption, for an aggregate payment of
$12,188.168 Under a constant return assumption, H would owe additional tax of $12,281.169
As evidenced by these examples, actual tax rates are less effective
in tandem with average value in the typical case where the gain
amount increases over time. By allocating a constant gain amount to
income tax exclusion for qualifying gain on home sales should minimize certain tax
avoidance attempts; e.g., classification of purchase price as interest on seller-financed
sales. Id. § 121. Nonetheless, the benefits of interest-free deferral might distort selling decisions.
164 $100,000 x (1.5) 4 = $506,250.
165 This is the excess of the $303,125 average value over the purchase price.
166 $500 + $1250 + $2375 + $12,187.50 = $16,312.50.
167 [(3 years x 1%) + (1 year x 3%)] + 4 years = 1.5%.
168 $203,125 x .015 x 4 = $12,187.50.
169 ($50,000 + $125,000 + $237,500 + $406,250) x .015 = $12,281.25.
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each year, too little (much) tax results when tax rates are higher in
the later (earlier) years. 170 Accordingly, the tax rate choice significantly depends on the gain allocation method. Average tax rates
should be utilized in conjunction with an average value assumption.
With somewhat less certainty, we recommend actual tax rates in conjunction with a constant return assumption. Although an average rate
could soften constant return distortions in certain cases, actual tax
rates generally should provide results closer to annual reassessment at
actual value. 17 1 Any administrative advantages from a single, average
rate do not appear significant enough to outweigh the substantive ad172
vantage of actual tax rates.
4.

Transition/Revenue Issues

Transition concerns typically involve the unfairness of rule
changes in the middle of the game. By contrast, consider a possible
elimination of the federal mortgage interest deduction which raises
strong equity concerns since existing homeowners paid more for their
homes due to the capitalization of the federal tax subsidy. Our proposal would have a more limited, and appropriate, impact. For clarification, back taxes should be charged only for post-enactment years. 173
Owners with low current assessments would lose the benefits only on a
going forward basis, and recall how uncertainty over the duration of
low assessments prevents full capitalization of such benefits. Furthermore, unlike the mortgage deduction which reflects government policy of encouraging home ownership, our proposal eliminates
preferential treatment unrelated to policy goals.
Consider next possible revenue shortfalls in the interim period
due to collection timing differences between the current systems and
our proposal. This does not appear to be significant. While substitut170 We focus here on maximizing the correlation to value. Unlike the interest
charge analysis, value deviations here would not necessarily move the system towards
purchase price, which might constitute a desirable alternative norm. See supra Part

V.C.2.
171 Average rates could minimize distortions when constant return allocates excess
gain to a high-rate year. We nonetheless recommend actual rates since (1) average

tax rates could increase distortions where such excess gain was allocated to an unusually low-rate year, and (2) actual rates work better to the extent actual appreciation
follows the constant return pattern.
172 The average tax rate is based on the varying tax rates from prior years.
173 Otherwise, long-term owners would be treated differently depending on
whether they sell before or after enactment. Separately, as discussed in greater detail
below, the current assessed value could serve as the "purchase price" for homes
owned at the time of transition.
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ing purchase price for the current assessed values might alter significandy the aggregate tax base, current assessed values could serve as
the purchase price for current owners to avoid such shifts. 174 If so,

our system generally would not result in a relatively lower base in the
immediately succeeding year(s) since most jurisdictions do not reassess annually. And over the long run, the increased tax collections
generated by sales-back tax collections from sellers and increased
tax base for the buyer-generally should offset the failure to increase
the tax base via reassessments. Normal sales patterns should provide a
relatively steady revenue stream, at least for larger jurisdictions. 17 5 Accordingly, any tax rate adjustments should be relatively narrow and
short lived.

176

D. PotentialProblem Areas
1. Intergenerational Transfers
Our system, which relies on reassessment on sale, requires a
mechanism to deal with properties transferred at death or during lifetime without benefit of sale. 177 Without such a mechanism, clever
planners could put off reassessment for generations through a series
of gratuitous transfers.1 78 Intergenerational transfer of residential
homes is not currently the norm in the United States; demographic
and mobility patterns ensure that most children will not choose to live
174 Purchase prices could be lower or higher than assessed values, depending on
the current system. Adjustments would be necessary for governments which currently
assess at a uniform percentage of value. See supra note 16. If assessed values were
used as the starting point, back taxes at sale would be calculated based on such assessed value and the sales price.
175 It is possible, of course, that long-term homeowners would agitate for repeal of
the proposed system as their potential liability for back taxes approaches. There is,
however, a natural check on repeal: the interests of the residents who do not plan to
sell in the immediate future. For these residents, who at any given moment should
constitute a significant majority of homeowners, repeal would bring a sudden and
immediate increase in current taxes.
176 In lieu of tax rate increases, assessments prior to sale could be increased each
year by a low percentage, similar to California's Proposition 13. In addition to possibly smoothing revenue flows, this would reduce the back taxes due at sale, possibly
minimizing tax avoidance attempts. We generally do not recommend this adjustment
which is more complicated and relaxes possible voting benefits from deferred taxes.
We nonetheless highlight the advantages of this adjustment, which might appeal on
balance to some localities.
177 The analysis extends to transfers at below-market prices to, e.g., family
members.
178 For a discussion of a similar issue under California's Proposition 13, see supra
notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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in their parents' homes. Instead, when homeowners die, most homes
are sold, with the proceeds distributed among the homeowner's heirs
or will beneficiaries. Our problem, then is two-fold: first, dealing with
the small number of cases in which homeowners and their families
want to keep homes in the family, and second, assuring that our system does not cause that number to balloon by creating tax advantages
for retaining, rather than selling, homes of deceased homeowners.
Perhaps the most elegant solution to this problem is a system of
179
competitive assessment along the lines articulated by Saul Levmore.
Upon death of any homeowner, any individuals or corporations with
an interest in purchasing the home would be entitled to submit a
sealed bid for the home. The homeowner's executor would then be
faced with a choice: sell to the highest bidder, or retain the property
for the homeowner's family members, with a new assessment set at the
bid offered by the highest bidder. If the executor chooses to retain
the property, the estate would become liable for the retroactive adjustment ordinarily due upon sale. From that adjustment, the municipality might pay a small commission to the highest bidder to encourage
bidding, which in turn increases future tax collections.
The same solution would also be appropriate when a homeowner
makes a lifetime transfer for no consideration. Bidders would be free
to bid on the home, and the transferee would then have to choose
between selling to the highest bidder or retaining the home at the
new assessment while paying the retroactive adjustment ordinarily due
upon sale. An exemption for transfers to a surviving spouse (both
during life and at death)-akin to the marital deduction in the federal estate tax-would assure reassessment at least once a generation,
without disrupting the lifestyle of either member of a married
couple.

180

This endorsement of a competitive assessment system raises a natural question: why not adopt the Levmore model for all assessments,
thus avoiding all of the administrative costs of the current assessment
system while maintaining assessments at current market value? At
least three reasons counsel against wholesale adoption of a competitive assessments system, but, as we shall see, none of the three reasons
forecloses use of such a system upon death or transfer without
consideration.
First, Levmore himself recognized that the competitive assessment system intrudes on a critical stick in the bundle of property
179 Levmore, supra note 115, at 783-88.
180 See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2000) (codifying estate tax marital deduction); id.
§ 2523(a) (permitting deduction of gifts between spouses).
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rights: the right of an owner to hold out against prospective purchasers who value the property more than the owner does. The competitive assessment process gives bidders the power to coerce sales, and, as
Levmore remarks, "[i] t is a small step from forced sales and holdouts
to eminent domain." 18 1 Forced sales and private condemnation
threaten to deny homeowners some of the subjective value they attach
18 2
to their homes.
Second, a competitive assessment system threatens the benefit of
the mortgage bargain homeowners make when they purchase their
homes. Suppose, for instance, a purchaser buys a home for $100,000
with a 6% fixed rate, thirty-year mortgage in year 2000. Five years
later, the market value of the home is $150,000, even though mortgage rates are now 9%. Even if the homeowner attaches no subjective
value to the home, the home is worth more than $150,000 to the
homeowner simply because the 6% mortgage is not portable.
Levmore's competitive assessment scheme might require the homeowner to accept an assessment of above $150,000 simply to avoid loss
83
of her mortgage bargain.1
Third, a competitive assessment system does nothing to ameliorate the moral hazard problem that arises when the benefits of municipal services are not fully capitalized into home price. A homeowner
who attaches subjective value to his home, but derives less than average benefit from municipal services, has every incentive to retain his
home through the competitive assessment process but to vote against
municipal services that might, in the aggregate, generate more benefits than costs.
These problems are far less significant when a competitive assessment scheme is restricted to death and gratuitous transfers. Protecting subjective value is of far less concern to a prospective new ownereven a family member-than to the long-term owner. The family
member will not, in general, be entitled to the benefit of the original
181 Levmore, supra note 115, at 789.
182 Indeed, it is this potential loss of subjective value that underlies landowner
attacks on government power to condemn land for economic development purposes.
See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61,
83-84 (1986) (discussing the potential loss in subjective value associated with exercise
of eminent domain power). This power of condemnation was recently upheld by the

United States Supreme Court. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
183 Suppose, as Levmore suggested, a municipality offers a commission to winning
bidders in order to drive assessments toward market value. If a potential bidder
knows that a homeowner enjoys a mortgage (not transferable to any other home) at a
below-market rate, the bidder also knows that the homeowner has financial incentives
to bid above the home's market value in order to avoid the risk of losing the favorable
mortgage.
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owner's mortgage bargain. And a family member of the original
homeowner is less likely to move into the home and area if the municipal package of services does not meet her needs. Finally, the sheer
volume of competitive assessments will be far smaller-and any market dislocations less serious-if competitive assessment is used only
upon death or gratuitous transfer.
Our proposal does not, however, depend on acceptance of a competitive assessment scheme for intergenerational transfers. Ajurisdiction could, instead, conduct a traditional reassessment of property
upon death or gratuitous transfer. The number of such reassessments
would be far smaller than required under any current scheme, and
reassessment upon death or intergenerational transfer would not present the liquidity concerns associated with more broadly based reassessment schemes.1 8 4 Moreover, any imperfections in the revaluation
would be rectified, ultimately, upon sale by the next owner, who
would pay a higher adjustment tax upon resale. Again, the relevant
comparison is with current law, and even if a jurisdiction were to
adopt our proposal but conduct traditional reassessments upon death,
the evils associated with reassessment practices would be far smaller
than under a regime that provides frequent reassessment of all parcels
within the municipality.
2.

Corporate Entities

When natural persons own real property, transfer or death is inevitable. By contrast, corporate entities might theoretically retain real
property forever. Hence, for properties not owned by individuals, our
assessment mechanism must make some provision for updating
assessments.
The concern is twofold. First, corporate property owners should
pay the appropriate tax, and second, individual property owners
should not take title as corporate entities simply to avoid reassessment
of the property upon death or transfer.
As with intergenerational transfers, a competitive assessment system provides an attractive solution to the problems associated with
real property held in the corporate form. Once property is transferred to a corporate entity, the property would be subject to competitive reassessment on a periodic basis, perhaps every five years. At that
point, the corporate owner would be required to submit the property
for competitive assessment. No further tax would be due on sale.
184 Drawing upon the federal estate tax, any lingering liquidity concerns at death
could be addressed by a deferred payment schedule. See I.R.C. § 6166 (2000 & Supp.

2002).
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Even more than in the case of intergenerational transfers, the
competitive assessment scheme threatens no significant values when
the owner is a corporation. By definition, the corporate owner generally attaches no subjective value to the property. Moreover, the corporation does not face the same liquidity issues that might face
residential homeowners; if the corporation lacks assets to pay taxes,
and if income from the property is insufficient to generate those assets, the corporation can sell the property. Finally, periodic competitive reassessments reduce the incentive for homeowners to shelter
property from the property tax by holding the property in the corpo85
rate form.
A municipality could, of course, reject competitive assessment of
corporately owned properties in favor of traditional assessment of
properties held in corporate ownership. Such a decision would not
reduce the advantages of our proposal for properties held in individual ownership.
3.

Improvements

The model we have developed so far assumes a homeowner who
purchases a home and sells essentially the same home several years
later at a somewhat different price. Often, however, a homeowner has
made improvements to the house, and some of the increased value
reflects the improvements made. How should those improvements be
treated for property taxation purposes? In principle, money spent on
improvements should be treated equally with money spent to
purchase the home.18 6 That is, a purchaser who spends $120,000 on a
185 The same competitive reassessment mechanism could be used to deal with all
residential housing held by an entity other than a single living individual or two individuals holding property as tenants in common or joint tenants. That is, the competitive reassessment scheme could be used when homes are owned by partnerships,
trusts, or co-tenancies comprised of more than two individuals.
186 The assumption here is that the objective is to tax the value of land and improvements. Starting with Henry George, however, extensive literature has rejected
that assumption, arguing instead for a tax on the value of land. HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY 406 (New York, Robert Schalkenbach Found. 1948) (1879).
George argued that a tax focused on land rather than improvements would create
appropriate incentives for making land productive:
Everywhere that land had attained a value, taxation, instead of operating, as
now, as a fine upon improvement, would operate to force improvement.
Whoever planted an orchard, or sowed a field, or built a house, or erected a
manufactory, no matter how costly, would have no more to pay in taxes than
if he kept so much land idle.
Id. at 437. Even those sympathetic to land-value taxation recognize the practical difficulties in separating land value from value of improvements for taxation purposes.
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home should be treated no differently from one who purchases the
home for $100,000 and immediately invests $20,000 in home
improvements.
This result can best be achieved by adding the cost of improvements to the homeowner's assessment from the year in which the improvements are made. At sale, the adjustment for increased value
would take account of the taxes already paid on the improvements.
Example 5. Homeowner purchases home for $100,000 in year 2000,
and makes improvements, at a cost of $20,000, in 2002. Homeowner sells the home for $150,000 in 2005.
Homeowner will pay tax for the years 2001 and 2002 on an assessment of $100,000, and for years 2003-2005 on an assessment of
$120,000. Upon sale in 2005, the homeowner will pay an adjustment based on the $30,000 difference between the $150,000 sale
price and the homeowner's $120,000 "basis" (the sum of his original
purchase price and the cost of his improvements). Assuming a constant 1% tax rate, the lack of an interest charge, and adoption of the
average value method, the homeowner will owe an additional $750
1 87
at sale.
The difficulties with assessing improvements are not so much difficulties in theory as difficulties in proof. An owner who makes significant improvements to his home has little incentive to report them if
the result will be an immediate increase in her tax assessment. Most
taxpayers will prefer to defer tax until sale. We address this problem
in three ways, reflecting three different types of improvement.
First, for improvements that do not increase the square footage of
the house, we would make reporting voluntary, at the option of the
homeowner.18 8 If the homeowner does not report the costs of these
improvements, tax would be deferred until sale.
Our reasons for voluntary reporting are twofold. First, many of
these "improvements" reflect routine maintenance-repainting, replacing a roof-that every homeowner must complete on a cyclical
basis. Little inequity should result if these improvements are subject
only to tax adjustments on sale. Second, with respect to interior imSee, e.g., DIcK NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX 201 (1966) (noting that absence of market evidence "would make testing of assessment levels and quality virtually impossible in many circumstances").
187 Homeowner would owe about $843 at sale under the constant return calculation, maintaining the other assumptions. (The annual return is about 4.88%. The
values at the end of each successive year would be $104,880; $130,000 (including the
$20,000 improvement); $136,350; $143,000; and $150,000. Additional tax would
equal $49 + $100 + $163 + $230 + $300.)
188 De minimis improvements should be disregarded.
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provements, any other treatment would encourage evasion of the reporting requirement and would penalize those homeowners who
complied with the requirement. Indeed, even under current law,
homeowners are not generally. obligated to permit assessors to inspect
the interior of their homes, and homeowners who have made significant improvements are loathe to do so for fear of increasing their tax
burden. Our approach improves on current law, because upon sale
improvers will ultimately pay tax based on the value of their improvements; under current law, homeowners never pay tax on the value of
hidden improvements. 8 9
Second, for improvements that increase the square footage of an
existing house, we would require reporting and reassessment, with a
presumption that the improvements add value to the property in proportion to the increase in square footage. That is, if a homeowner
builds a 500 square-foot addition to a 2000 square-foot house purchased for $100,000, the house would be reassessed for $125,000, unless the homeowner can establish that the cost of the addition was less
than $25,000.190
Improvements that increase square footage warrant different
treatment for two reasons. First, these improvements have the greatest potential to increase market value. Although remodeling a
kitchen or replacing a roof undoubtedly has the potential to increase
a home's value, the potential increase pales in comparison with an
addition that doubles or triples the size of a house. Significant increases in size don't merely improve the house, but transform it into a
significantly different house. Second, because improvements that
189 See, e.g., Russell, supra note 119 (noting while major improvements are supposed to trigger new assessment in New Orleans, homeowners "trick the city by get-

ting a permit for minor work while undertaking something more expensive .... [or
fail] to get permits at all").
190 Without a presumption, a homeowner could evade the reassessment by coming forward with bills that reflect only a fraction of actual cost; because municipal
officials have little basis to rebut the homeowner's figures, the homeowner could realize significant advantage by understating average cost. A shift in the burden of coming forward, and in the burden of persuasion, mitigates this imbalance. The
government also should be allowed to rebut the presumption. If not, taxpayers could
reduce their taxes at sale by making low-cost square footage additions close to sale.
Increased assessment close to sale lowers the tax bill.

Our presumption applies the percentage increase in building square footage to
the entire purchase price of the parcel. One might object that this approach ignores
the contribution of land value to the value of the parcel as a whole. We offer two
responses. First, our presumption is rebuttable by the homeowner, who has an incentive to come forward with evidence of overvaluation. Second, in general, the new
square footage is likely to be more valuable, per square foot, than older square footage, offsetting in part any failure to consider land cost.
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change square footage typically require a building permit, they are
already subject to reporting requirements. Unlike internal improvements, a homeowner is unlikely to be able to hide a second story or a
new room. As a result, requiring reassessment is unlikely to penalize
homeowners for reporting their improvements.
The third class of improvements is those made to previously vacant land. When a developer builds homes for resale, assessment is
not a problem; the home will be assessed at market price as soon as
the developer sells the home. When the improvement is not made for
resale, but by a contractor who intends to maintain the home for his
own use, or for rental purposes, we suggest competitive assessment.
Subjective value is not likely to be a problem with a newly constructed
home (and the builder can take account of the competitive assessment scheme before building). And a builder who has just invested in
a new home is not in a position to express liquidity concerns. As a
result, the drawbacks accompanying a competitive assessment scheme
do not exist.
CONCLUSION

The property tax remains a cornerstone of local government finance, but no consensus has developed about one of its foundations:
how should property be assessed? One group of states, focused on
liquidity concerns and protection of long-term residents, has opted
for assessment based upon purchase price, ignoring the resulting disparities between tax and property value, and generating incentives for
inefficient voting behavior by municipal residents. Another group, focused on horizontal equity concerns, has mandated frequent reassessment of property. These states have overlooked the costs and
inaccuracies associated with reassessment, while simultaneously exacerbating the tendency of older and long-term residents to oppose provision of efficient municipal services.
Our proposal, which combines a purchase price approach with a
retrospective adjustment upon sale, improves on each of the approaches currently in force. We have presented a number of variations on the basic theme, allowing room for reasonable disagreement
on an unresolved question: how closely property taxation should track
current market value in order to generate optimal government decisionmaking. We hope and expect that our proposal will generate further discussion and analysis of that understudied issue.

